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ABSTRACT

The repeated occurrences of protest violence during or following Black Lives
Matter (BLM) demonstrations has been an issue for the United States since the mass
demonstrations of Ferguson, MO in August of 2014. Since then, the United States has
experienced a trend of organized demonstrations which follow officer-involved shootings
of primarily African American civilians. How and why communities around the nation
react to police violence can vary, as do the explanations for the responses of community
members, demonstrators, and police officers. The protests of Ferguson, MO (2014) and
of North Minneapolis, MN (2015) were similarly prompted by police shootings but each
experienced a different kind of protest and police response. This thesis explores how
different theoretical perspectives illuminate differences between how Ferguson and North
Minneapolis reacted to police violence and argues that multiple theories are needed for
analyzing such protests.
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INTRODUCTION

The repeated occurrences of protest violence during or following Black Lives
Matter (BLM) demonstrations has been an issue for the United States since the mass
demonstrations of Ferguson, MO in August of 2014. Since then, the United States has
experienced a trend of organized demonstrations which follow officer-involved shootings
of primarily African American civilians.1 How and why communities around the nation
react to police violence can vary, as do the explanations for the responses of community
members, demonstrators, and police officers. The protests of Ferguson, MO (2014) and
of North Minneapolis, MN (2015) were similarly prompted by police shootings but each
experienced a different kind of protest and police responses. This thesis explores how
different theoretical perspectives illuminate differences between how Ferguson and North
Minneapolis reacted to police violence and argues that multiple theories are needed for
analyzing such protests and finding ways to prevent further violence.
Racially charged officer-involved shootings and the demonstrations that follow
and can become violent cost the lives of civilians and police officers as well as officers’
careers. Violent protests may cost upwards of millions of dollars in the violence inflicted
on people and in the looting/destruction of property. The mass demonstrations of
Ferguson, MO ended after many instances of confrontational-violence through the 17

Other examples involved Eric Garner in New York City and Freddie Gray in Baltimore. Protests
following Garner’s death remained relatively peaceful in NYC, but similar protests in other US cities (e.g.,
Berkeley) turned violent. See Olivia Laughland, Kayla Epstein, and Jessica Gelnza, “Eric Garner protests
continue in cities across America through second night,” The Guardian (December 5, 2014):
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/dec/05/eric-garner-case-new-york-protests-continue-throughsecond-night. The response after Gray’s funeral began peaceful but experienced aggressive police
responses which prompted the demonstrations to turn into riots. See Jenna McLaughlin and Sam Brodey,
“Eyewitnesses: The Baltimore Riots Didn’t Start the Way You Think,” Mother Jones (April 28, 2015):
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/04/how-baltimore-riots-began-mondawmin-purge/.
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days.2 The occupation in North Minneapolis, MN remained peaceful and, largely, did not
experience any confrontational violence over the course of 18 days.3 This exploratory
study employs secondary research to examine what can be learned by applying seven
theories pertaining to the occurrence of protest violence in explaining the differing
reactions to police violence experienced in Ferguson and North Minneapolis. My
analysis will explore each multi-day incident to illuminate in the protest reactions by
utilizing the explanations of three theories focuses on the micro-context,4 three focused
on police and protester practices,5 and one theory on the macro-contextual effects of
timing and feedback.6
This thesis presents a series of charts (nine total) to illustrate the kinds of theories
and ideas analyzed in each section. Each theory (i.e., micro context; police practices and
protester interactions; and macro-context) has a chart with varying descriptors dependent
to its section. Charts in the Literature Review section showcase each theory’s name,
contributing author(s), and core ideas. Charts in the Methodology section showcase each
theory’s name as well as the applicable evidence from the case studies. Charts in the
Analysis section showcase explanations for each theory’s findings.7

See James Queally, “Ferguson unrest: What you need to know,” Los Angeles Times (March 17, 2015):
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-ferguson-unrest-what-you-need-to-know-20150312htmlstory.html.
3 See Jon Collins, Tim Nelson, and Matt Sepic, “Mpls. Police clear out 4th Precinct protest site,” Minnesota
Public Radio News (December 3, 2015): https://www.mprnews.org/story/2015/12/03/4th-precinct.
4 Explanations from context theories: ethnic-diversity, community violence, and community/policing
culture.
5 Explanations used from practice-based theories: threat/repression, tactical innovation, and dynamic
interactions.
6 Explanations used regard timing, history, event-sequence, and policy feedback.
7 Micro-contextual theories are denoted as “C
1,2,3,” police practice theories are denoted as “P1,2,3,” and
macro-contextual theories are denoted as “T1.”7 There are three sets of three charts in the following
sections: Charts 1-3 for the Literature Review; Charts 4-6 for the Methodology; and Charts 7-9 for the
Analysis.
2
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The remainder of the study is outlined as follows. First, I review academic
literature on (1) micro-contextual theories focused on the occurrence of violence; (2)
theories on the evolution of policing/protest-policing models in conjunction with protest
developments; and (3) macro-contextual theories rooted in American political
development perspectives on the role of timing and sequence in explaining the order and
value of events and policy through positive feedback mechanisms. Second, I discuss this
study’s methodology and discuss the evidence being examined and their relation to the
theories discussed in the previous section. After discussing the key contexts in both
places, I examine the protest incidents and key events in Ferguson and North
Minneapolis. Fourth, I analyze how the various theories relate to each incident in
illuminating a fuller explanation for the difference in responses between the two cities.
Finally, I will conclude by discussing how a comprehensive explanation is needed to
understand the different reactions to police violence, summarize key findings and their
relationship to the theories, and note possible implications for future academic research
into protest violence.

3

LITERATURE REVIEW

Micro-Contextual Explanations
Studies on the outbreaks of violence span many academic theories, each with a
differing explanation depending on the type of violence studied and the scope of the
analysis. It has been argued that it is important to factor in both private and communitylevel variables when explaining the likelihood and intensity of riots. According to the
Ethnic-Diversity Theory (C1) of DiPasquale and Glaeser (1998), there is some correlation
between private costs and the incidence and intensity of riots but only some communitylevel variables show a correlation. While poverty is not correlated, Theory C1 found a
connection between higher incidence/intensity of riots and the community-level variable
of ethnic-diversity.8 Theory C1 applies to riots and not simply demonstrations which
exhibit violent behavior, making this theory more applicable to understanding the
reaction from Ferguson rather than North Minneapolis.
Chart 1: Micro-Context Theories

Theory Name (C1, 2, 3)

Author(s)

C1: ‘Ethnic Diversity’
Theory

DiPasquale and Glaeser
1998

C2: ‘Community
History of Violence’
Theory

Olzak, Shanahan, &
McEeaney 1996

C3: ‘Area/Policing
Culture’ Theory

McPhail, Scweingruber,
and McCarthy 1998;
Gillham and Noakes
2007

8

Core Ideas
A higher level of ethnic diversity
in a community is linked to higher
rates of incidence and intensity
when it comes to riots.
A previous history of communitylevel violence (i.e., demonstrations
which turn violent) increases the
likelihood of future violence on a
community-level.
-There is a clear sequence of
policing styles in the US.
-An area’s culture affects their
policing style and how policing
violence is utilized.

Denise DiPasquale and Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are Homeowners Better
Citizens? (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998), p. 1-31.

4

According to the Prior-History of Community Violence Theory (C2), developed
by Olzak, Shanahan, and McEeaney (1996); and Accomazzo (2012), there is an overlap
of sociological and criminology perspectives illuminate possible explanations for race
riots. They contend that a variety of socio-political combined-factors underlie the
involvement between political economy theory and violence. Theory C2 notes that a
previous history of community-level violence increases the likelihood of future
occurrences of violence in the same way as a previous history of segregation would
impact interracial integration (per Accomazzo, 2012; Olzak, et al., 1996). These theorists
argue there is a possibility to predict, and possibly prevent, collective violence through a
heightened understanding of the interaction “between macro-level factors and the
instability of sudden social and economic shifts,” (per Accomazzo 2012; Nassauer 2016).
A third micro-contextual explanation focuses on an area’s policing culture.
Community-Oriented Policing (COP) has been described as the most significant
development in US policing in the past 50 years because of its shift in policing paradigms
(i.e., from reactive to proactive) per Wells and Falcone (2005). The models and styles of
policing have evolved in response to public & private perceptions and criticisms, and this
can be readily seen in the US from the early twentieth century to the present. The
varying styles characterize the policies and practices employed by law enforcement
agencies during those specific decades. See discussion on mid-twentieth century policing
models in Appendix A. The start of the community policing model (i.e., “soft policing”)
began in the mid-1970s and grew until its peak in 2000, and, working in tandem, during
the 1980s into the 1990s there was a communications-based policing style known as

5

‘negotiated management.’ This style uses force as a last resort and primarily attempted to
have people police themselves per McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy 1998.
From the early 1990s and into the latter 2000s, there was a rise of a more
aggressive and militarized policing model (i.e., “hard policing”), particularly following
the advent of the anti-globalization movement (e.g., WTO protest in Seattle 1999) and
heightened counter-terrorism efforts after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center.
See discussion on aggressive policing trends in Appendix A. The trend toward a more
aggressive policing style has been described by researchers as ‘strategic incapacitation’
per Gillham and Noakes 2007. Wood (2014) argues that this trend can be seen in the US
and Canada and is a process of ‘Militarization of Protest Policing.’ She describes this as
being epitomized by “pre-emptive control, fortification, the escalation of coercive
policing strategies, incoherent negotiation, indiscriminate information gathering, and the
portrayal of protest as a threat.”9 Calafati (2013) identified that when protests are
primarily made up of politically or socially marginalized groups, they are seen as
“unruly,” and when protests are viewed as such, more coercive and violent tactics tend to
be used.10 The use of militarized policing characteristics11 can be tracked over time to
better explain sequencing trends in policing models. In response to the heightened
militarization of law enforcement in this country, there have been large efforts to return
to the community policing model, but the US may be seeing a slight return to those
aggressive, paramilitary style policing tactics. The removal of these tactics made up a
portion of the demands made by groups like the Occupy movement & BLM. After the
See L.J. Wood, “Crisis and Control: Militarization of Protest Policing,” London: Pluto Press, 2014, p. 3-6:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183pdpn.
10 Luca Calafati, “Understanding the Return of Violent Protest Policing in Europe: Some Reflections
Provoked by the Italian Case,” MA Dis., Sussex University (2013):
https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=luca-essay-police-violence.pdf&site=10
11 See additional discussion on Military-Style Policing in Appendix A.
9
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Occupy demonstration in 2010 and the Ferguson protests in 2014, American policing
then shifted away from overly-aggressive and militarized tactics under the Obama
administration, and refocused its aims toward implementing and defining the principles
and practices of community-oriented policing.12
Police Practice-Protest Interaction Theories
Theory P1 emphasize how social movements can have the effect and/or perception
of threatening people in power Earl (2003).13 Varying threats are linked to new or
confrontational protest-tactics, number of protesters, or radical goals, which can lead to
“harsh repression” (Bromely and Shupe 1983; Davenport 2000; McAdam 1982; Wisler
and Guigni 1999).14 Ratliff (2011) notes that certain social movement characteristics
from past instances of protest can persist for multiple decades in the United States.
Ratliff argues that certain social movement characteristics have a greater chance of
bringing a police presence and/or causing violence to occur.15

President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing, Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2015:
https://www.phillypolice.com/assets/forms-reports/TaskForce_FinalReport.pdf
13 Thomas N. Ratliff, “On the Stage of Change: A Dramaturgical Approach to Violence, Social Protests,
and Policing Styles in the U.S.,” (PhD diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2011), p.
14-15.
14
Ratliff, “On the Stage of Change,” p. 14.
15 Note: Ratliff lists some of the characteristics of social movement violence as coming from there being
African Americans or counter protesters present, the deployment of “more confrontational” tactics, the use
of multiple tactics, and property damage occurring.
12
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Chart 2: Police Practice and Protest Interaction Theories

Theory Name (P1, 2, 3)
P1: ‘Threat/Repression’
Theory

Author(s)
Ratliff 2011; and Earl
200316
Bromely and Shupe 1983;
Davenport 2000; McAdam
1982; and Wisler and
Guigni 1999

P2: ‘Tactical Innovation’
Theory

Wang and Soule 2016;
McCammon 2003; and
Wood 2012.

P3: ‘Dynamic Interaction’
Theory

Ratliff 2011; Collins 2008,
2009; and Nassauer 2016

Core Ideas
-Law enforcement is more
likely to respond to
protesters with repressive
tactics when they are
viewed as “threatening.”
-Protesters are viewed as a
“threat” depending on: (1)
their use of new or
confrontational tactics; (2)
the number of protesters;
and/or (3) if protesters’
goals are too radical.
Tactical innovation is the
emergence or use of either
new or “novel” protest
tactics.17
Physical confrontations
between protesters and
police can only be
established when both sides
interact in a way that
initiates violence.

Tactical innovation is an important factor in studying social movements because it
has been linked to protest success (McAdam 1983).18 Theory P2 can be thought of as the
creation of either new or novel re-combinations of old protest-tactics (Wang and Soule
2016). Previous scholarship on the matter has two main arguments for explaining the
See Bromley, David G. and Anson D. Shupe, Jr. 1983, “Repression and the Decline of Social Movement
Organizations: The Case of New Religions,” p. 335-47 in Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies,
edited by J. Freeman. New York: Longman as cited in Ratliff, “On the Stage of Change,” p. 14.
See Davenport, Christian, 2000, Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious
Politics, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers as cited in Ibid., p. 14.
See McAdam, Doug, [1982] 1999, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970,
2nd ed, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press as cited in Ibid., p. 14.
See Wisler, Dominique and Marco Giugni, 1999, “Under the Spotlight: The Impact of Media Attention on
Protest Policing,” Mobilization 4(2):171-87 as cited in Ibid., p. 14.
17 Note: Tactical innovation is linked with novel re-combinations of older protest tactics.
18 Tactical innovation/interaction is linked with protest success for the following reasons: (1) innovation
temporarily increases the protesters’ bargaining power and (2) the emergence of new protest techniques can
be correlated to peak-moments in a movements’ activity. See McAdam, Doug, “Tactical Innovation and
the Pace of Insurgency,” (1983) American Sociological Review 48(6):735–54.
16
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facilitation of tactical innovation: (1) the ‘macro-historical context’ explanation19 and (2)
the ‘protest characteristic’ explanation,20 but I would contend that both can be utilized in
tandem per McCammon 2003. Tarrow (1995) argues that “newly invented forms of
collective action” (i.e., tactical innovation) emerge at the beginning of a protest cycle. I
concur with and will utilize the notion that tactical innovation is rooted in “movementopponent dynamics,” specifically in the interplay between external environment and
internal characteristics (McCammon 2003). Multi-issue protest21 serves as “creative
laboratories” for tactical innovation and can generate “re-combinatorial” tactical
innovation(s) as groups with varying interests work together (Wang and Soule 2016;

See Ibid.; McAdam, Doug, Tarrow, Sidney, Tilly, Charles, 2001, Dynamics of Contention, New
York: Cambridge University Press; McCammon, Holly J., 2003, “Out of the Parlors and into the Streets:
The Changing Tactical Repertoire of the U.S. Women’s Suffrage Movements,” Social Forces 81(3):787–
818; Tarrow, Sidney, 1995, “Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the
Repertoire of Contention,” p. 89–115 in Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action, edited by Traugott,
M. Durham, NC: Duke University Press; Tarrow, Sidney, 2011, Power in Movement, 3rd ed. Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press; Tilly, Charles, 1978, From Mobilization to Revolution, New
York: Random House; Tilly, Charles, 1986, The Contentious French. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press;
Tilly, Charles, 1995, “Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758–1834,” p. 15–42 in Repertoires and
Cycles of Collective Action, edited by Traugott, M. Durham, NC: Duke University Press as cited in Wang,
D.J. and Soule, Sarah, “Tactical Innovation In Social Movements: The Effects of Peripheral and MultiIssue Protest,” American Sociological Review (April 29, 2016) Vol 81, Issue 3, p. 517 – 548:
https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122416644414.
20 See also Clemens, Elisabeth S., 1993, “Organizational Repertoires and Institutional Change: Women’s
Groups and the Transformation of American Politics, 1890–1920,” American Journal of Sociology
98(4):755–98; Darnovsky, Marcy, Epstein, Barbara, Flacks, Richard, eds., 1995, Cultural Politics and
Social Movements, Philadelphia: Temple University Press; Naples, Nancy A., 1992, “Activist Mothering:
Cross-Generational Continuity in the Community Work of Women from Low-Income Urban
Neighborhoods,” Gender & Society 6(3):441–63; Piven, Frances F., Cloward, Richard A., 1979, Poor
People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail, New York: Vintage Books; Robnett,
Belinda, 1996, “African-American Women in the Civil Rights Movement, 1954–1965: Gender, Leadership,
and Micromobilization,” American Journal of Sociology 101(6):1661–93; Staggenborg, Suzanne, 1988,
“The Consequences of Professionalization and Formalization in the Pro-choice Movement,” American
Sociological Review 53(4):585–605 as cited in Wang and Soule, “Tactical Innovation,” p. 517-548.
21 See Isaac, Larry, Christiansen, Lars, 2002, “How the Civil Rights Movement Revitalized Labor
Militancy,” American Sociological Review 67(5):722–46; Minkoff, Debra C., 1997, “The Sequencing of
Social Movements,” American Sociological Review 62(5):779–99; Mische, Ann, 2002, “Cross-Talk in
Movements: Reconceiving the Culture-Network Link,” p. 258–80 in Social Movement Analysis: The
Network Perspective, edited by Diani, M., McAdam, D. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; Olzak,
Susan, Uhrig, S. C. Noah, 2001, “The Ecology of Tactical Overlap in New Social Movements in West
Germany,” American Sociological Review 66(5):694–718 as cited in Ibid.
19
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Wood 2012).22 Certain protest tactics have been linked to the emergence of tactical
innovation, but some of those same characteristics (i.e., use of new, combinations of old,
or confrontational protest tactics) have also been linked to increased risk of protest
violence by state-repression (Bromely and Shupe 1983; Davenport 2000; McAdam 1982;
Wisler and Guigni 1999; and Earl 2003).23 From this, I would argue that tactical
innovation, although linked to protest success, also increases the likelihood of protest
repression/violence.
The micro-situational explanation, from the emotional-dynamic theory, operates
under the operational-assumption that for uncontrollable violence to be established,
both/all-involved parties involved need to participate in its initiation (i.e., Theory P3:
“dynamic interaction”), otherwise the emotional tension cannot break past the violence
inhibition threshold (Collins 2008, 2009; Nassauer 2016). Ratliff (2011) argues that
collective violence emerges from the “dynamic interaction” of all available actors at the
event (i.e., police, protesters, and counter-protesters). As I alluded to in the previous
paragraph, when it comes to the “dynamic interaction” explanation, police are usually the
only side that can make the exception and initiate a violent-confrontation without the
opposing side actively-participating. When protesters initiate violence, police can either
respond with repression or refuse to engage-physically, proving supportive of the
“dynamic interaction” theory.

22

Multi-issue protest is described by Wang and Soule (2016) as, “when protesters express multiple goals,
principles, and identities typically associated with two or more dissimilar claims or movement groups.”
23 Ratliff, “On the Stage of Change,” p. 14-15.
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Macro-Contextual Theories
The emphasis of path dependent theories is the timing of events in relation to one
another. In other words, an initial move toward one direction prompts continued
movement in that direction while making it increasingly difficult to change directions as
time goes on. Historical institutionalists focus, in addition to timing and sequence, on
feedback/interaction mechanisms,24 the mapping of actors’ pursuits of interests within the
defined-processes of an institution, and what occurs when a single element/variable
changes over time (Glenn 2004). Path dependency focuses on explaining regime stability
and growth and is largely associated with the work of Paul Pierson (1993, 2000).25
Pierson (2000) examines the path dependent sequencing of political processes and argues
that the temporal ordering significantly impacts the outcomes of events or processes.
Path dependent analyses focus on the timing of events relative to one another because, as
Pierson argues, the order of events and/or processes crucially impact outcomes. He
examines and lists three settings that are predisposed to positive feedback: selfreinforcing sequences, event sequences (if occurrences are causally-linked), and

Feeback mechanisms are srgued to work in three ways: (1) self-reinforcing; (2) “initial event backfire;”
and (3) historical conjunctures per Hacker, J. S., 2002, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle Over Public
and Private Benefits in America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Skocpol, T., 1992, Protecting
Soldiers and Mothers, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press; Orren, K. and Skowronek, S., 2001,
‘What is Political Development?’, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association; and Lieberman, R. C., 1998, Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State,
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press as cited in Glenn, Brian J., “The Two Schools of American
Political Development,” Political Studies Review (2004) Vol. 2, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University/Oxford University, p. 155-156: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-9299.2004.00005.x.
25 See also Pierson, Paul, “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies
in American Political Development, Cambridge University Press, 27 Oct. 2000,
www.cambridge.org/core/journals/studies-in-american-political-development/article/not-just-what-butwhen-timing-and-sequence-in-political-processes/E9741EE229E51B3676A062DAA1A608A1 as cited in
Bridges, Amy, “Path Dependence, Sequence, and History,” Studies in American Political Development,
Vol. 14 (Spring 2000), p. 109:
https://static.cambridge.org/resource/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:201702230653173290411:S0898588X00213047:S0898588X00003047a.pdf.
24
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conjunctures.26 Theories that utilize order and sequence recognize the necessity for
concepts that identify pattern-diversities in order understand the “causal power of
temporal connections among events.” Pierson emphasizes the importance for researchers
to know why, where, and how concepts come into play during temporal processes.27
There is a focus on sequencing in political processes, that being the inquiry of a
variable(s) value and the order in which they appeared.28 Pierson (2000) contends that
path dependent analysis of historical developments in politics and processes, ordered in a
temporal sequence of events, can assist in better understanding complex social dynamics.
Chart 3: Macro-Context Theories

Theory Name (T1)
T1: ‘Timing/Feedback’
Theory

Author(s)
Glenn 2004; Pierson 1993,
2000; Mettler and Sorelle
2014; and Skocpol 1992.

Core Ideas
The occurrence and order of
events affects the same
aspects of future events.

Aminzade (1992) argues theories of continuity and change that focus on order and
sequence comprehend that the “causal power of temporal connections among events”
requires concepts to identify the diversity of patterns found among temporally connected
events.29 One such example is the historical process of US policing styles and how it can
help illuminate why Ferguson and North Minneapolis reacted differently. Each style can
be categorized as either ‘negotiated management’ or ‘strategic incapacitation.’ Each
response from law enforcement can be characterized by three main factors: degree of
violence used, number of behaviors considered prohibited, and the level of

26

See Pierson, Not Just What but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes, p. 74: Conjunctures
are prone to positive feedback when they involve the simultaneous occurrence of regularly unrelated
sequences or the interruption of on-going sequences by unforeseen events.
27
See Ibid., p. 72-92: Concepts needed for analysis of temporal processes are: path dependence; critical
junctures; sequencing; events; time horizons; duration; timing; and unintended consequences.
28
See Ibid., p. 73: he quotes Tilly (1984) from his work on sequencing, “when things happen within a
sequence affects how they happen.”
29
See footnote 11 on ‘required concepts.’

12

communications between protesters and police (McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy
1998; and Gillham and Noakes 2007).
Policy feedback theory looks at how political considerations affect policy analysis
and how policies can affect critical aspects of governance. The analysis of Theory T1 can
assist in showing how certain policies affect democracy and illuminate “unintended
consequences” that accompany certain policies. Mettler and Sorelle (2014) argue that
this theory highlights “how policies created previously affect the likelihood and form of
future policy creation.”30 The feedback mechanisms used for theories on timing and
sequence have applicability to insights on how public policies can, “through their design,
resources, and implementation,” alter the behaviors and attitudes of the mass publics and
political elite, as well as affect how policymaking institutions and interest groups evolve
per Pierson 1993; Mettler and Soss 2004.31 Skocpol (1992) states how “policy, once
enacted, restructures subsequent political processes.”32 Mettler and Sorelle (2014) argue
that in contemporary politics new policies are generated through a system that inherently
influences them based on existing policies. Policy diffusion is an example of this where,
“policymakers from one area learn from the experiences of policymakers elsewhere,” and
how policymakers can be influenced by interest groups that pushed for changes in other
areas.33

30

See Mettler and Sorelle, “Policy Feedback Theory,” in Theories of Policy Process, ed. Paul Sabatier and
Christopher Weible (New York: Avalon Publishing, 2014), p. 152.
31
See Ibid., p. 152.
32
See Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 58
as cited in Mettler and Sorelle, “Policy Feedback,” p. 152.
33
See Mettler and Sorelle, “Policy Feedback,” p. 152.
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CHAPTER ONE

METHODOLOGY

It is well-documented what occurred during each respective protest in Ferguson,
MO (August 2014) and North Minneapolis, MN (North Minneapolis, MN), but what has
not been looked at are the specific differences in reactions to police violence as well as
the reasons for these variations. My exploratory study analyzes the possible explanations
derived from seven violence-related theories to see how they illuminate the different
reactions which took place in Ferguson in 2014 and North Minneapolis in 2015. Below I
discuss the sorts of evidence relevant to each theory’s analysis.
Chart 4: Evidence and Micro-Context Theories

Theory Name (C1, 2, 3)
C1: ‘Ethnic Diversity’ Theory
C2: ‘Community History of Violence’
Theory
C3: ‘Area/Policing Culture’ Theory

Applicable Evidence
-Census data on ethnic diversity.
-Public records and historical accounts on
the experiences of community-level
violence.
-Public records and historical accounts on
each area’s culture.
-Government and media reports on each
area’s policing culture prior to each
incident.

In applying Theory C1, archived and recent data sets from the US census gave
detailed and thorough information regarding, among other facets, the ethnic diversity of
Ferguson and North Minneapolis. By analyzing the changes in ethnic demographics over
time it becomes clear how long each area has been predominantly made up of minority
citizens who regularly experience discriminatory police practices. Theory C2 states that
greater incidents of community violence increase the likelihood of future events
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exhibiting violence. Historical records of past-civil disturbances provide insights into
areas which exhibit more violence. Looking to the histories of each area illuminates the
various trends of community-level violence that can occur and the later-effects they can
bring. Public records describing the culture of each area allows for Theory C3 to help
illuminate why certain police practices (i.e., unlawful and discriminatory) were
commonplace prior to each protest event.
Chart 5: Evidence and Police Practice and Protest Interaction Theories

Theory Name (P1, 2, 3)
P1: ‘Threat/Repression’ Theory

P2: ‘Tactical Innovation’ Theory

P3: ‘Dynamic Interaction’ Theory

Applicable Evidence
-COPS “after-action” report(s) for Ferguson,
MO & N. Minneapolis, MN with daily incident
statements on protesters’ activities/tactics and
officers’ responses.
-News articles (accredited and local),
interviews, and footage from social media on
the protest incidents of both Ferguson, MO &
North Minneapolis, MN.
-After Action Reports on protester tactics
through the incidents in Ferguson, MO and N.
Minneapolis, MN.
-News reports and protester accounts of tactical
choices and changes throughout the
demonstrations for both incidents.
-Live streams and social media coverage of the
protests.
-After Action incident reports on protesterpolice confrontations throughout the
demonstrations in Ferguson, MO and North
Minneapolis, MN.
-News reports and protester accounts on
protester-police confrontations in both cases.

The analysis of events with respect to Theory P1 utilizes a mix of incident
statements and news/social media reports on the events of each protest to identify when
law enforcement perceives protesters as threatening and when they decide to use
repressive tactics in response to this. The daily incident statements detail official reports
on the activities of both protesters and law enforcement officers along a uniform
15

timeframe. Local news and social media archives and streams are utilized as a means of
double-checking the official reports on what and when protesters did that made them be
viewed as threatening to the point of police-protesting violence. Theory P2 similarly
utilizes daily incident reports as well as local and social media’s resources but is focused
on the emergence of either new or “novel” combinations of older protest tactics.
Additionally, the incidents of tactical innovation can be analyzed on a macro-scale for
each demonstration on the effect it had on the overall success of the protests. Theory P3
uses similar resources as the previous two theories but focuses on the violence that stems
from interactions between protesters and police officers. It also analyzes when certain
actors (e.g., either protesters or police) attempt to initiate violent confrontations but fail
due to a lack of effort on the other side.
Theory T1 utilizes news reports and after-action assessments to analyze the events
of Ferguson and North Minneapolis in coordination with previous events related to
policing, protests, and BLM. This allows for better illumination for how previous events
may have impacted the outcomes of the cases detailed in this study, particularly with
police practices.
Chart 6: Evidence and Macro-Context Theories

Theory Name (T1)
T1: ‘Timing/Feedback’ Theory

Applicable Evidence
-Historical and official accounts of
previous events temporally linked to
police-protest practices, BLM protests, and
government-sponsored police reforms.
-Reports and accounts on police: degree of
violence used by the police; number of
behaviors considered prohibited; and level
of communications.
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CHAPTER TWO

FERGUSON UNREST

Introduction to Case Study
The shooting of 18-year-old Michael Brown inspired not one but at least three
‘waves’ of protest incidents, although my focus will be on the first incident. The 17-day
period of demonstrations contained repeated instances of lawful and unlawful protests as
well as riotous behavior (e.g., looting and property destruction) which took place in and
around Ferguson, MO in the months after the August 9th, 2014 fatal-shooting of Michael
Brown by Officer Darren Wilson. The timeframe of this first incident started just after
the midday shooting on August 9th through midnight of August 25th (the day of the
funeral). Michael Brown, an unarmed black man, was shot six times in the back by white
police officer Darren Wilson while having his hands raised in the air. Emotional tensions
rose immediately following the shooting incident as information being released on the
shooting was delayed and as Michael Brown’s body remained for four and a half hours
on the pavement where he died.34 Similar to other cases, the Ferguson PD (in addition to
the regional response) was not expecting nor prepared for a long-term mass
demonstration, and this was the primary reasoning behind initiating the Code 1000 plan.35
The demonstrations started out peacefully but tensions were exacerbated by, among other
34

The image of Michael Brown’s body on the pavement spread across social media, increasing the
presence of people at the site of the shooting.
35
The Code 1000 Plan is a law enforcement mutual aid contingency plan that mobilizes personnel and
equipment within the St. Louis County to certain law enforcement authorities who do not think they have
sufficient resources for dealing with an on-going crisis,
(https://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/document%20library/police/oem/code%201000/code%201000
%20NOVEMBER%202015.pdf).
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factors, paramilitary style equipment and use of aggressive tactics which many protesters
viewed as a means of intimidation.
What has become known as the ‘Ferguson Unrest’ was the culmination of a longstrained relationship between the police and its St. Louis communities, aggressive protest
policing tactics, and the incredible speed at which information and misinformation was
spread through social media and then to national and local news platforms. Out of the
multiple investigations & reports issued concerning Ferguson, the DOJ’s investigation
into the Ferguson Police Department (FPD) that shed considerable light concerning the
history and culture of community-relations between the police department and the
citizens they serve.36 The investigation was initiated on September 14, 2014 to reveal if
there was unlawful conduct occurring in the FPD.37 The costs incurred by Ferguson from
the subsequent rioting and looting of buildings, from the first incident, are estimated to
total around $4.6 million dollars. It should be noted that the second incident of protests,
following the grand jury decision not to indict officer Darren Wilson, cost the city
approximately another $20 million dollars. These figures represent the initial cost to the
city and did not account for the long-term costs associated with damage to businesses
without proper insurance and loss of real estate values.
Historical Context
Contention between law enforcement and black communities is longstanding in
United States history and the greater St. Louis metropolitan area of Missouri holds no

36

DOJ Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, p. 6.
Note: “This investigation was initiated under the pattern-or-practice provision of the Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3789d (“Safe Streets Act”), and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“Title VI”).” See Ibid., p.1.
37
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exception in that regard.38 According to a Business Insider article, the St. Louis
Metropolitan Area is the sixth most segregated in the United States.39 The demographic
makeup of Ferguson has shifted considerably since the 1990s when a majority of
residents were white. The black population of Ferguson has grown, according to U.S.
Census Bureau, from around 25% in 1990,40 to 52% in 2000,41 and up to 67% in 2010.42
While these demographic changes have been more rapid for Ferguson, ‘white flight’ had
impacting the United States, as well as the greater St. Louis area, since the 1940s and
1950s.43 In the past 60 years St. Louis City has lost over 500,000 residents due to ‘white
flight,’ while exurban areas in adjacent counties (e.g., St. Charles county) have grown
considerably since the 1960s.44 According to maps composed by Colin Gordon showing
the movement of specific ethnic groups over time in the St. Louis area using census date

While Ferguson’s population may be two-thirds back, its’ police force only had 3 black officers out of 53
and its top city officials were mostly all white when the ‘Ferguson Unrest’ occurred. See Pamela Engel,
“These Maps of St. Louis Segregation Are Depressing,” Business Insider, August 15, 2014,
http://www.businessinsider.com/colin-gordon-maps-white-flight-in-st-louis-2014-8.
39 See John R. Logan and Brian Stults. 2011. “The Persistence of Segregation in the Metropolis: New
Findings from the 2010 Census” Census Brief prepared for Project US2010.
http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010 as cited in Jacobs, Kiersz, and Lubin, “The 25 Most Segregated Cities in
America,” Business Insider, November 23, 2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/most-segregated-citiesin-america-2013-11?op=1
40 See 1990 Census of Population General Population Characteristics Missouri, U.S. Census Bureau (Apr.
1992), available at ftp://ftp2.census.gov/library/publications/1992/dec/cp-1-27.pdf (last visited Feb. 26,
2015) as cited in U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department,
(Washington DC, 2015), p. 6, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf.
41 See Race Alone or in Combination: 2000, U.S. Census Bureau (2000), available at
http://factfinder.census.gov/ bkmk/table/1.0/en/DEC/00_SF1/QTP5/1600000US2923986 (last visited Feb.
26, 2015) as cited in Ibid., p. 6.
42 See 2010 Census, U.S. Census Bureau (2010), available at
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/DEC/10_SF1/QTP3/1600000US2923986 (last visited Feb.
26, 2015) as cited in Ibid., p. 6.
43 See Alana Semuels, “White Flight Never Ended,” The Atlantic, July 30, 2015,
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/07/white-flight-alive-and-well/399980/.
44 As black residents fled the city, white residents moved further out into the fringe-areas; St. Charles
County is 90% white and has grown by 1200% since 1960. See Malcolm Gay, “White Flight and White
Power in St. Louis,” Time, August 13, 2014, http://time.com/3107729/michael-brown-shooting-fergusonmissouri-white-flight/.
38
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from 1940-2000,45 as black residents move into particular neighborhoods, whites move
farther and farther away. The populace of Ferguson, MO in recent decades has
undoubtedly become more ethnically diverse: with 67.4% African American, 29.3%
white, 0.5% Asian, 0.4% Native American, 0.4% other, and 2.0% from two or more
ethnicities.
A possibly overlooked factor regarding the community reactions to police
violence may lay with America’s evolving system of gentrification and segregation.
Glaeser and Vigdor (2012), among other scholars, argue that segregation between
American neighborhoods has reached its lowest point in over a century.46 Although a
new study from the American Sociological Review has found that, while segregation from
neighborhood to neighborhood (i.e., micro-segregation) is declining, segregation from
suburban communities to other suburban communities and segregation from cities to
suburban communities (i.e., macro-segregation) is increasing.47 What this means is that
while overall segregation in metro areas may be declining, “segregation between places
(i.e., city-suburb or suburb-suburb) is rising” per Lichter 2015. The Kershner Report
noted two separate Americas: the black inner-city and white suburbs, but now American
cities are becoming more diverse as certain suburbs become more segregated. What this
means is that Ferguson matches this new age evolution of American segregation in which
cities are becoming more diverse while suburbs are becoming increasingly homogenous.
See ‘White Flight’ maps as cited in Pamela Engel, “These Maps of St. Louis Segregation Are
Depressing,” Business Insider, August 15, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/colin-gordon-mapswhite-flight-in-st-louis-2014-8.
46 See Edward Glaeser and Jacob Vigdor, The End of the Segregated Century: Racial Separation in
America’s Neighborhoods, 1890-2010, the Manhattan Institute’s Center for State and Local Leadership,
2012, p. 1-26.
47 See Lichter, “Toward a New Macro-Segregation? Decomposing Segregation within and between
Metropolitan Cities and Suburbs,” American Sociological Review, 2015 as referenced in Alana Semuels,
“White Flight Never Ended,” The Atlantic, July 30, 2015,
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/07/white-flight-alive-and-well/399980/.
45
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Narrative of Events
Each day and night, Ferguson saw crowds of people (from small groups to full-on
crowds of hundreds of people) flooding the streets in protest, with evenings having
noticeably more people with pre-meditated criminal intentions (e.g., looting, arson,
vandalism). After Brown’s death on August 9, the report states48 crowds of
approximately 200 people formed around the homicide scene on Canfield Drive.49 The
crowds were described, from interviews with police officers after the incident, as “chaotic
but not out of control,” although as time passed, the crowd became increasingly hostile
with on-scene officers.50 As the crowds began to grow in the hundreds, law enforcement
decided for Canfield Drive to be closed off to regular drivers. Eventually the crowd
began to push into the homicide scene, prompting a call for assistance from the canine
unit. Statements were taken from both FPD and St. Louis County PD officers detailing
how unprecedented both the initial crowd’s behavior to the incident and the
demonstrations which followed.51 With Brown’s body on the ground for multiple hours52
and as additional emergency vehicles came on-scene, the levels of fear rose in the crowd
of bystanders but as more people joined the crowd, bystanders became “increasingly

Numbers of participants in crowds based on the COPS “assessment team’s interviews with police
officers and reviews of relevant photographs and videos.” See COPS, Ferguson “After-Action,” p. 7.
49 Ibid., p. 7.
50 U.S. Department of Justice, Department of Justice Report Regarding the Criminal Investigation Into the
Shooting Death of Michael Brown by Ferguson, Missouri, Police Officer Darren Wilson, memorandum of
understanding, March 2015, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_ of_michael_brown.pdf.
51 After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 8.
52 See David Hunn and Kim Bell, “Why Was Michael Brown’s Body Left There for Hours?” St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, September 14, 2014, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/whywasmichael-brown-s-body-left-there-for-hours/article_0b73ec58-c6a1-516e-882f74d18a4246e0.html;
Yvette Carnell, “Ferguson Police Defend Decision to Leave Michael Brown’s Body in the Street for 4
Hours,” Breaking Brown, August 25, 2014, http://breakingbrown.com/2014/08/ferguson-police-defenddecision-to-leave-michael-browns-body-in-the-street-for-4-hours/ as cited in After Action Report:
Ferguson, p. 8.
48
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abusive toward law enforcement.”53 During the time as police were processing the scene,
there were three instances of gunfire “volleys” reported by officers to have originated
from the crowd.54 It was at this point that the on-duty St. Louis County PD captain called
in the Code 1000.55 After continued gunshots were reported behind the apartment
complex, mutual aid under Code 2000, was requested by a St. Louis County PD
sergeant.56 Two staging areas for police vehicles were set up: the first at Original Red’s
BBQ (0.3 miles from the homicide scene) and the second on Glen Owen Drive (0.2 miles
from the homicide scene).57 As the afternoon of day one continued, another group of
approximately 150-200 protesters formed at Original Red’s BBQ58 (on West Florissant
Avenue) and as the day progressed, crowds at both locations continued growing in
participants.59 It is noted that the increase in participant numbers was due to the initial
number of people gathered, “ongoing texting, social media posts, and the police
activity.”60 It was almost 3 PM of August 9 when multiple gunshots were reported and
from this the crowds became more and more hostile, as a result the Bearcat armored
vehicle was deployed along with tactical officers of the St. Louis County PD dressed in

From interviews with police officers as noted in Ibid., p. 8.
Note: Reported gunfire from St. Louis County PD computer-aided dispatch (CAD) occurred at 12:57
PM, 1:15 PM, 1:55 PM, and 2:15 PM. See After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 8.
55 Code 1000 is a mutual aid plan that allows for other agencies to assist in a situation. See Ibid., p. 5.
56 Code 2000 is a part of the Code 1000 mutual aid plan. See Ibid., p. 5.
57 Canfield Drive goes west about 200 yards and turns into Windward Court for about another 300 yards to
the west. At that point, Windward Court intersects with Glen Owen Drive—the second staging area—
where the only route out of the area is northbound. While it is possible to drive into Canfield Green
Apartments via this route, it is far from ideal because the roads are narrow and wind through apartment
buildings and residential areas. See Ibid., p. 9.
58 See note: Original Red’s BBQ was a popular restaurant and became iconic as a staging area for both law
enforcement and protesters throughout the assessment period because of its location on the corner of West
Florissant Avenue and Canfield Drive. Original Red’s BBQ was burned down by rioters on November 24,
2014, after the grand jury decision. As cited in Ibid., p. 9.
59 Ibid., p. 11.
60 Ibid., p. 9.
53
54
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riot gear.61 Around 5 PM – 6 PM, officers recognized the need for greater assistance to
deal with the increasing number of participants in the crowds.62 Media coverage, as well
as posts from Twitter, continued to reiterate63 how long Brown’s body was allowed to
remain on the street and, even after the body removal, this fact continued to fuel tensions
into the evening.64 It was reported from interviews that on-scene officers did not fully
understand the depth of emotional upset caused by Brown’s body lying on the street for
four hours, or how negatively standard homicide scene protocols were being interpreted
by the crowds.65 Officers assumed that once the homicide scene was cleared and the
roads reopened, the crowds would wind down and come to an end, but this incident
(again) proved to be an unprecedented one.66 The community’s desire for answers, and
law enforcement’s inability to provide any information regarding the shooting, only
fueled tensions and kept the crowds’ numbers active and growing.67 Reportedly, by 8:40
PM, the size of the crowds increased to the point where police vehicles on Canfield Drive
were completely surrounded by demonstrators.68 Around 9 PM, officers began leaving
the staging areas as more people stayed on West Florissant Avenue while congregating
around the site of the shooting (referred to as the vigil area) on Canfield Drive as well as
Note: Bearcat arrived at approximately 2:43 PM and tactical officers arrived around 3:15 PM. See After
Action Report: Ferguson, p. 10.
62 Ibid., p. 10.
63 See Gordon Coombes (@surrealintel), “Michael Brown’s Body Left in Street for Four Hours No
Ambulance Instead SUV Picks Up His Dead Body. #Ferguson #OpKKK,” Twitter post, November 24,
2014, 1:28 p.m., https://twitter.com/surrealintel/status/536994812235239424/photo/1 as cited in Ibid., p.
10.
64 The St. Louis County Police Department Investigation Report 14- 43984 shows that the shooting was
reported at 12:02 p.m., and the St. Louis County PD homicide investigation after-action timeline shows that
the body was removed by the St. Louis Livery Service at 4:00 p.m. as cited in Ibid., p. 10.
65 Ibid., p. 10.
66 See Defining Moments for Police Chiefs, Critical Issues in Policing Series (Washington, DC: Police
Executive Research Forum, 2015), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/definingmoments.pdf as cited in
Ibid., p. 11.
67 Note: Canfield Drive, from West Florissant Avenue, was reopened at 7 PM. See Ibid., p. 11.
68 Note: Demonstrators surrounding policing vehicles on Canfield Drive was interpreted by officers as
threatening behavior to which officers were directed to go to the Glen Owen Drive staging area. See Ibid.,
p. 11.
61
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out front of the Ferguson PD headquarters.69 Law enforcement officers reported that the
first 12 hours of crowds were primarily made-up by local individuals with personal
interest in the incident, those who witnessed part or all the incident, and/or those who
were alerted from texts/social media.70
The early morning of August 10 saw protesters dissipating and while officers
predicted that an afternoon gathering would occur in addition to an evening vigil, they
thought the demonstrations would come to an end that Sunday.71 It was on the second
day that a press conference72 was held by St. Louis County PD Chief Belmar where he
described some of the facts related to the officer-involved shooting of Mr. Brown.73 This
day saw the formation of various groups at three sites: (1) near the vigil site on Canfield
Drive; (2) on West Florissant Avenue near Original Red’s BBQ; and (3) in front of the
FPD station on South Florissant Road. This is reportedly when crowds swelled up to
around 700-800 people and a change in dynamics occurred, shifting from people
observing to demonstrating.74 Members of the crowds began chanting and, those on
South Florissant Road, started to block the road by sitting in it.75 As the gatherings grew
a Code 200076 was made, calling in assistance from the St. Louis Metropolitan PD

Ibid., p. 11.
Note: This includes the St. Louis County PD Intelligence Unit, the St. Louis Metropolitan PD
Intelligence Unit, the St. Louis Fusion Center, and the Missouri Information Analysis Center. After Action
Report: Ferguson, p. 11.
71 Based on interviews with law enforcement officers. See Ibid., p. 11.
72 See Thomas Christopher, “Full Press Conference Ferguson Police Shooting of Michael Brown,”
YouTube, August 10, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zUXqPDT8hr4 as cited in Ibid., p. 11.
73 Note: Chief Belmar announced that the investigation was being handled by St. Louis County PD upon
request from FPD and how Brown assaulted an officer and struggled for his gun before the shooting
incident but did not release the name of the involved-officer. See Ibid., p. 11.
74 Note: Crowd numbers ranged from 700-800 people, according to a Missouri State Highway Patrol
commander.
75 See Melanie Moon, “Police Keep Watch over Protesters in Ferguson,” FOX 2 Now, August 10, 2014.
http://fox2now.com/2014/08/10/policekeep-watch-over-protesters-in-ferguson/ as cited in Ibid., p. 12.
76 76 Code 2000 is a part of the Code 1000 mutual aid plan. See After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 5.
69
70
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tactical unit.77 Into the evening of August 10, numbers continued to grow, and looting
and property damage started to begin.78 In addition to windows of businesses being
broken, members of the crowds eventually started throwing objects at police officers and
their vehicles. St. Louis County PD estimated the crowds peaked that night at 1000
people.79 Law enforcement attempted to take control of the situation, and maintain
officer safety, through deploying armored vehicles and canine units from multiple
agencies, although these tactics were largely seen by protesters as aggressive. Greater
assistance was needed by St. Louis County PD and so SWAT teams from varying
agencies80 were called on-scene around 10 PM. Protesters were ordered to disperse and
when the crowds remained, smoke cannisters were deployed but were reported to have
little to no effect. CS tear gas (2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile) was then deployed by
the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, which was more effective in dispersing
large numbers of people.81 Law enforcement began responding to calls of looting and
burglary and, on August 10, a reported 30 businesses were looted.
Into the morning of August 11 (day three), large crowds of protesters and looters
remained active until 3:00 AM and 4:00 AM.82 This day saw the announcement of a
separate investigation into the shooting incident led by US Attorney General, Eric H.

Note: The St. Louis Metropolitan PD is not in the County of St. Louis and as such is not part of the
county Code 1000 Plan; it responded based on a mutual aid agreement. See Ibid., p. 12.
78 Note: Video evidence and interviews support how the QuikTrip convenience store on West Florissant
Avenue was burned down as other businesses near Canfield Drive (e.g., Sam’s Meat Market) sustained
losses from looting and property damage. See After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 12.
79 After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 12.
80 Note: Assistance came from the St. Louis Metropolitan PD SWAT team, the Missouri Highway Patrol
SWAT team, and the St. Charles County multijurisdictional SWAT team. See Ibid., p. 14.
81 F.T. Fraunfelder, “Is CS Gas Dangerous? Current Evidence Suggests Not But Unanswered Questions
Remain,” British Medical Journal, February 19, 2000,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1127513/.
82 Ibid., p. 15.
77
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Holder, Jr.83 At 6 PM, community members shared a joint-prayer for Brown as well as
took part in peaceful demonstrations during a meeting put on by the NAACP. Protests
remained peaceful until the evening when demonstrators reportedly threw objects (e.g.,
bottles, rocks, Molotov cocktails, etc.) at officers as the mood of the gatherings turned
aggressive and violent. Eventually this led to the burning of business and other property
damage to which law enforcement responded with attempts to disperse the crowd. Law
enforcement deployed armored vehicles, tear gas, PepperBall projectiles, bean bag
rounds, and Stingerballs. 84 Protesters complained that the police response was too
aggressive, but the owners of damaged businesses and homes criticized the police for
responding too slowly to the violent demonstrations. While others became more
aggressive, and prompted police response, some protesters were able to maintain peaceful
demonstrations. While law enforcement cited the use of armored vehicles and tear gas
for officer safety and the dispersal of criminals, many community members viewed it as
“evidence of police militarization.”85 In addition to the widely criticized “military-style
equipment and tactics” was the total lack of uniformity among the law enforcement
agencies when it came to the ways demonstrators were arrested as well as treatment of
those individuals post-arrest.86 Up to this point, the FPD had not released any

“FBI Investigating Ferguson Police Shooting of Teen Michael Brown,” NBC News, August 11, 2014,
http://www.nbcnews.com/ storyline/michael-brown-shooting/fbi-investigating-ferguson-policeshootingteen-michael-brown-n177761 as cited in Ibid., p. 15.
84 See “Projectiles,” PepperBall, accessed May 18, 2015, http://www.pepperball.com/projectiles/; “12
Gauge Ballistic Bean Bag Round,” Keep Shooting, accessed May 18, 2015,
http://www.keepshooting.com/12-gaugeballistic-bean-bag-round.html; and “Stinger 32-Caliber Rubber
Balls with Safety Clip,” Safariland Group, accessed May 18, 2015,
http://www.safariland.com/stingerrubber-ball/stinger-32-caliber-rubber-balls-w-safety-clip-1152928.
html#start=1 as cited in After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 16.
85 Ibid., p. 16.
86 Note: Example of differing arrests/treatment between the agencies involved in the “Ferguson Unrest:”
FPD and the St. Anne PD jail and law enforcement that used the St. Louis County jail. It is noted that
while differing police procedures occurred, the primary difference of treatment was due to jail operations
rather than police policy. Ibid., p. 17.
83
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information about the shooting or the officer’s identity, and this continued to fuel
tensions. That evening saw crowds grow past the numbers of previous nights (i.e., over
800-1000 people)87 and from this came heightened media coverage, which led to
increased numbers of protesters coming from the “St. Louis metropolitan area and
beyond.”88 The overall pattern, up to that point, of the demonstrations was largely
peaceful during the day, but it is noted that a majority of daytime demonstrators that were
interviewed mentioned leaving as it got dark but before the violence started.89 There
were noted changes in the dynamics and character of the protests.90
Crowd control efforts for August 12 saw continued use of varying law
enforcement agencies SWAT teams.91 The protest-policing tactics implemented under
the St. Louis County PD became highly criticized and damaging due to images of the
incident circulating through the media. It was because of this that Chief Samuel Dotson,
of the St. Louis Metropolitan PD, decided to withdraw his men from any continued
protest response efforts aside from providing four officers to assist with “diverting traffic
and keeping pedestrians and motorists safe.”92 It is worth noting that at 10am a group of

Canfield Apartments became a “no-police zone,” allowing greater numbers of protesters and looters to
assemble. It was from the growth of size and intensity that came from this disorder that garnered the event
national attention. Ibid., p. 17.
88 Ibid., p. 17.
89 Community member interview with assessment team stated, “Once it got dark…it turned ugly.” See
After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 17.
90 Note: “Interviews with personnel from the four core agencies consistently noted the changes in the size
and dynamics of the mass gatherings, particularly from day to night. Moreover, as days passed, the
character of the demonstrators in the evening also seemed to change.” See Ibid., p. 17.
91 On August 12, the Missouri State Highway Patrol deployed 26 day-shift troopers and 20 night-shift
troopers as well as Troop C and F SWAT teams. On August 13, the agency deployed 16 day-shift troopers
and 15 night-shift troopers plus the SWAT teams. Missouri State Highway Patrol Ferguson Response
August 9–27, 2014 [PPT] (Jefferson City, MO: Missouri State Highway Patrol, 2014) as cited in Ibid., p.
17.
92 Jeremy Kohler, “St. Louis Police Chief Says He Does Not Support Militarized Tactics in Ferguson,” St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, August 14, 2014, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/st-louispolice-chiefsays-he-does-not-support-militarized/article_b401feba-b49e-5b79-8926- 19481191726f.html.
87
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protesters peacefully gathered at the headquarters of the St. Louis County PD.93 The St.
Louis County PD and Missouri Highway Patrol maintained their tactical presence
through a number of, widely-perceived, military-style methods of crowd control.94 As
these military-style responses continued, the number of complaints and reports in the
media95 increased as well as complaints from local residents.96 A no-fly zone was
initiated following a St. Louis County PD report of a police helicopter being shot at the
previous day,97 although some contend that it was a means of maintaining control over
the various media outlet’s aircrafts.98 According to interviews conducted by the
assessment team, protests during the fourth day remained largely peaceful, but through
the evening of August 12 into the morning of August 13, the number of protesters from
other regions arriving in Ferguson increased steadily.99 August 12 experienced a new

Protesters had with them a list of demands regarding the investigation into Brown’s death. The St. Louis
County PD is headquartered out of Clayton, Missouri. See Ibid., p. 17.
94 Crowd control methods included: armored vehicles, long-range acoustic device (LRAD), tear gas, and
less-lethal weapons. See “Public Safety/Law Enforcement, Homeland Security, Border Control, and More,”
LRAD Corporation, accessed May 18, 2015, http://www.lradx.com/site/content/view/254/110 as cited in
Ibid., p. 17-18.
95 See Nick Wing, “Actual Military Veterans Say Cops in Ferguson Are Excessively Armed, Untrained
Wannabes,” The Huffington Post, August 14, 2014,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/14/policemilitarization-ferguson_n_5678407.html as cited in After
Action Report: Ferguson, p. 18.
96 Resident complaints of the police response were primarily referencing how the police’s tear gas would
waft into local neighborhoods. For example, see Kollege Kidd, “Ferguson Police Fire Tear Gas and
Rubber Bullets at ‘Mike Brown’ Protesters,” YouTube, August 12, 2014,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ocfdfL2j2OU; Colleen Curry, “Ferguson Police Use Tear Gas While
Again Clashing With Protesters,” ABC News, August 13, 2014,
“http://abcnews.go.com/US/fergusonpolice-tear-gas-clashing-protesters/story?id=24957752. The police
defend the use of tear gas at Jim Salter and Jim Suhr, “Police Defend Use of Tear Gas, Smoke at Protest,”
WAVY.com, August 14, 2014, http://wavy.com/2014/08/14/protests-turn-violent-in-st-louis-suburb/ as
cited in Ibid., p. 18.
97 Denver Nicks, “FAA Implements No-Fly Zone in Ferguson Amid Unrest Over Killed Teen,” Time,
August 12, 2014, http://time.com/3105035/ferguson-faa-no-fly-zone/.
98 Note: The no-fly zone was lifted on August 22. Jack Gillam and Joan Lowy, “FAA Approved No Fly
Zone in Ferguson, Missouri, to Keep Media Away,” Northwest Herald, last updated November 2, 2014,
http://www.nwherald.com/2014/11/02/ faa-approved-no-fly-zone-in-ferguson-missouri-to-keep-mediaaway/ azabefv/.
99 It was noted that a considerable number of protesters from away with prior-motivations for taking
advantage of the situation arrived in Ferguson. Ibid., p.18.
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development of “hacktivists,”100 from the group Anonymous under what they called,
‘Operation Ferguson,’101 which they targeted various municipal government and police
agency websites, telephone lines, email servers, as well as employed other computer
network intrusions that were linked with the identify theft of multiple officers (i.e.,
“doxing”). The St. Louis County PD Communications Unit102 got hacked on August 13,
according to interviews, and eventually the St. Louis County PD website experienced a
distributed denial of service (DDoS)103 that disrupted full-service (e.g., webmail and
smartphone access) for seven days (i.e., until August 19).104 On August 13, city officials
from Ferguson requested for all vigils to be held during the daytime, to better mitigate the
violence of previous nights, as well as for demonstrators to disperse before nighttime.105
This was also the day when two reporters were arrested at a restaurant nearby the
protests, only furthering the negative attention put towards police response tactics.106
Interviews with officers and citizens described how the pattern of the protests remained
consistent, with largely peaceful daytime protests followed by increasingly aggressive
nighttime protests.107
Alex Rogers, “Why Is Anonymous Involved in the Ferguson Protests?” Time, August 21, 2014,
http://time.com/3148925/ ferguson-michael-brown-anonymous/.
101 “Anonymous Operation Ferguson,” Anonymous, http://www.operationferguson.cf/.
102 See Louise Boyle and Damien Gayle, “Anonymous-Hacked 911 Tapes Reveal St Louis police ‘First
Heard About Michael Brown Shooting on the NEWS . . . and the Local Department Knew Nothing About
It’,” Daily Mail, August 13, 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ news/article-2724304/Anonymous-hacksSt-Louis-police-dispatchtapes-releases-calls-surrounding-cop-shooting-Michael-Brown.html
103 Note: A DDoS attack is a malicious attempt to make a server or a network resource unavailable to users,
usually by temporarily interrupting or suspending the services of a host connected to the Internet. For more
information, see “What is a DDoS Attack?” Digital Attack Map, accessed May 2015,
http://www.digitalattackmap.com/ understanding-ddos/ as cited in After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 19.
104 Internal systems were back-up and running by 1am on August 14, but there was no internet, email, or
access to the St. Louis County PD website. See Ibid., p. 19.
105 Doug Stanglin, “Ferguson Asks Protests, Vigils Be Held during Day,” KSDK.com, August 18, 2014,
http://www.ksdk.com/story/ news/local/2014/08/13/ferguson-asks-protests-vigils-be-heldduringday/14000463/.
106 “Reporters Arrested at Ferguson McDonald’s,” KSDK.com, August 18, 2014,
http://www.ksdk.com/story/news/local/2014/08/13/2-reporters-arrested-at-ferguson-mcdonalds/14037723/.
107 After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 19.
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The numbers of protesters remained steady as the number of concerns increased
throughout August 14,108 but after five days of demonstrations, it was perceived that the
situation was not improving under the incident command of the St. Louis County PD.109
A press conference was held in which Governor Jay Nixon designated, through executive
order,110 the Missouri Highway Patrol as the agency in charge of the protest response
with Captain Ronald S. Johnson as incident commander.111 Captain Johnson seemed to
have a positive impact as he reached out proactively to members of the community and
involved-groups.112 It is noted that Captain Johnson spoke at one of the vigils held in
honor of Michael Brown113 and consistently allowed photographs to be taken with
demonstrators. While Captain Johnson’s efforts had positive effects for the community
and demonstrators, his support towards protesters was negatively viewed and reportedly
lowered morale among officers.114
The next day, August 15, Ferguson PD Chief Jackson announced Darren Wilson
as the involved-officer in Brown’s death and, against the advice of Missouri State
Highway Patrol Capt. Johnson and St. Louis Count PD Chief Belmar, released video
footage indicating Brown’s involvement in a convenience store robbery prior to his fatal
Concerns held by local, county, and state political officials were due to continued property damage, “the
potential for life-threatening circumstances, the images of disorder in Ferguson, and complaints about the
police” which were being highlighted globally by news agencies and social media. Ibid., p. 20.
109 Ibid., p. 20.
110 Office of Missouri Governor Jay Nixon, “Executive Order 14-08,” August 16, 2014,
https://governor.mo.gov/news/executive-orders/ executive-order-14-08.
111 Office of Missouri Governor Jay Nixon, “Gov. Nixon Announces Missouri State Highway Patrol Will
Take the Lead on Security Responsibilities in Ferguson,” news release, August 14, 2014,
http://governor.mo.gov/ news/archive/gov-nixon-announces-missouri-state-highwaypatrol-will-take-leadsecurity.
112 Wesley Lowery, “With Highway Patrol, Hugs and Kisses Replace Tear Gas in Ferguson,” The
Washington Post, August 15, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2014/08/14/withhighway-patrol-hugs-and-kisses-replace-tear-gas-in-ferguson/.
113 Scott Neuman, “Capt. Ron Johnson: ‘I Am Sorry’ for Brown’s Death,” The Two-Way, NPR.org, August
17, 2014, http://www.npr.org/ sections/thetwo-way/2014/08/17/341161117/capt-ron-johnson-i-amsorryfor-browns-death.
114 This is according to interviews with law enforcement officers. See After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 21.
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altercation with Officer Wilson.115 The report attributes this announcement by Jackson to
the increase in protesters at the daily demonstrations and heightened emotional volatility
during the evening demonstrations.116 Despite this, the daytime protests in front of the
FPD remained nonviolent. During this time, it was reported that multiple businesses and
residents called-in complaints about “protesters blocking sidewalks, impeding entries into
their businesses, and, in some cases, blocking the street.”117 Evening demonstrations saw
increased numbers of lawful and unlawful protesters as well as the participants throwing
Molotov cocktails and other objects at officers. As a crowd gathered outside the store
Mr. Brown allegedly robbed, Captain Johnson foresaw complications and decided to
assist the store owner by moving the storeowner’s merchandise off-site. The trouble
predicted to occur at Ferguson Market and Liquor came about after Captain Johnson and
his men, “lost the parking lot.”118 As officers stood on the other side of the street, a
crowd formed and started looting the stores, and, because of the crowds of lawful
protesters in between, Captain Johnson decided that engaging the looters would be too
risky to the protesters’ safety and had his men stand down.119 Protesters became more
aggressive and actively sought to exploit issues that would provoke police officers into
responding violently.120 African American officers, in particular, were targeted, but
eventually the targeting-situation become so bad that front-line officers had to be cycled
Ibid., p. 21.
See Tom McCarthy, “Ferguson Protests: Michael Brown Family Calls for Calm amid Criticism of Video
Release—As It Happened,” The Guardian, August 15, 2014, http://www.theguardian.
com/world/live/2014/aug/15/ferguson-police-officer-michael-browndarren-wilson as cited in Ibid., p. 22.
117 Ibid., p. 22.
118 From an interview with a state trooper. See After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 21.
119 After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 21-22.
120 See “Black and in Blue: A Ferguson Police Sergeant Reflects on a Tough Time,” St. Louis PostDispatch, October 3, 2014, http://www.stltoday.com/ news/local/crime-and-courts/black-and-in-blue-aferguson-police-sergeantreflects-on/article_b71556de-68b1-5666f-a6ce-cc02c01b8343.html. For a more
recent video, see “Video Shows African American Officer Harassed by Protesters in Ferguson,” kmov.com,
March 24, 2015, http://www.kmov.com/story/28695988/video-shows-african-american-officer-harassedby-protestors-in-ferguson as cited in Ibid., p. 23.
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out “after 20-25 minutes… for their safety,” as a sergeant reported.121 Based on
interviews with officers, law enforcement noticed an increased gang presence within the
demonstrations for around three days.122 There were indications of a truce being made
between gangs to participate in the demonstrations from intelligence units. By August
15, the gang presence started fading away, although, throughout this time, protesters
continued to be primarily made-up of concerned citizens from communities around the
St. Louis area.123
August 16 (day seven) did not see noticeable changes in the numbers of
protesters, aside from the slight changes related to Governor Nixon’s enactment of a daily
curfew from midnight to 5 AM under his powers to declare a state of emergency. August
16 marked the first day of an informal incident command, under the Missouri Highway
Patrol’s leadership, establishing uniform methods among the law enforcement agencies
for responding to the demonstrations.124 This was initiated from an order Governor
Nixon gave to all law enforcement as part of his declaring a state of emergency. It is
reported that the strategy for incident command changed this day, allowing for officers to
integrate into the crowds and lessen the image of stand-offs between the police and
protesters.125 To better achieve this, the strategy utilized deploying officers in teams and
avoided having SWAT and tactical officers deployed until the situation deemed it
necessary.126 Although, based on officer interviews, “the strategy for managing the
demonstrations was continually changing.”127 To address the continuous problem of
Ibid.
After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 23.
123 Ibid., p. 23.
124 Ibid., p. 24.
125 Ibid.
126 This was aimed at having the effect of minimizing the visual presence of officers. See Ibid., p. 24.
127 Ibid., p. 25.
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people in groups throwing objects at officers, the “keep moving” (or “five-second rule”)
order was issued, and those who failed to disperse were arrested.128 It was noted that
crowds used vehicles to block the roadway during the evening demonstrations. There
was a reported seven people arrested for failure to disperse the first night of the curfew.
At around 12:15 AM on August 17, 150 demonstrators were reported to have
remained active despite orders from law enforcement to disperse. The group moved
towards Original Red’s BBQ, down West Florissant Avenue, where they eventually
blocked off the street for about an hour (from 12:23 AM to 1:30 AM).129 Like the
previous evening, after curfew went to effect at 12 AM, another seven people were
arrested for failure to disperse by the Missouri State Highway Patrol, and this became the
regular pattern for evenings that followed.130 Around 7:30 PM, an aggressive crowd of
almost a thousand was reported to have assembled near West Florissant Avenue, then
looted several businesses over the next four hours, and was followed by a few hundred
members of the crowd later attempting to overrun a command post.131 The curfew was
found to be ineffective by most officials132 and was replaced the following day when the
governor133 called in the Missouri National Guard.134 Even though the National Guard

Ibid., p. 25.
After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 25.
130 Accounts from media, citizens, and law enforcement found the protests similar from previous days; i.e.,
peaceful in the day and aggressive in the night. See Ibid., p. 25-26.
131 After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 26.
132 Note: Curfew was ineffective because instead of it preempting the nightly violence that typically
happened after midnight, the intense-violence merely shifted to happening right before the start of the
curfew. Ibid.
133 See Office of Missouri Governor Jay Nixon, “Executive Order 14-09,” August 18, 2014,
https://governor.mo.gov/news/executive-orders/ executive-order-14-09 as cited in Ibid., p. 26.
134 Note: Even though the curfew ended, police still demanded protesters disperse around midnight. See
Monica Davey, John Eligon, and Alan Blinder, “National Guard Troops Fail to Quell Disorder,” The New
York Times, August 19, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/us/ferguson-missouri-protests.html.
128
129

33

had no involvement with crowd control efforts, their presence had mixed emotions.135
August 18 saw multiple large crowds assemble (numbers in the hundreds which ranged
throughout the day), starting in the afternoon at a QuikTrip and McDonalds parking
lot.136 The ambiguity of the “keep moving” order prompted a court case to be filed on
August 18 that claimed the order violated free speech and due process rights.137, 138 That
evening saw incidents including the blockage of streets and sidewalks, objects being
thrown at officers, businesses suffering property damage, as well as a large fight
(between demonstrators) breaking out.139 After 5 PM, protesters started the march down
West Florissant Avenue, as gunshots were fired from the crowd and objects thrown at
officers. The police response consisted of SWAT units and multiple uses of tear gas, but
even so, the Original Red’s BBQ was reported to be on fire around 11:30 PM.140
An early press conference was held on August 19 where Captain Johnson
commented on the increased number of disorderly activities141 and police responses from
the night before into the early hours of the morning.142 Additionally, officers came under
“heavy gunfire” on West Florissant Avenue and Canfield Drive and multiple shots143
Some saw the National Guard positively in the added protection to businesses and people but were also
seen as “an escalation of the military presence.” See After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 26.
136 It was during this time that officers again issued the “keep moving” order, as noted from Aug. 16.
137 See Abdullah v. County of St. Louis, Missouri, et al., U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Missouri,
Eastern Division, Case 4:14CV1436 CDP, http://www.aclumo.org/files/1914/1262/7344/Abdullah_Preliminary_ Injunction.pdf as cited in Ibid., p. 27.
138 Note: On October 6, 2014, the judge enjoined the police from using the “keep moving” but expressly
noted that the decision did not prevent police from making arrests under the Missouri unlawful assembly
and failure to disperse statutes when the facts and circumstances met the elements of those statutes. See
Ibid., p. 27.
139 Ibid., p. 27.
140 Ibid.
141 Note: August 19 had protesters throwing rocks and other objects at officers, and one officer was
reported injured because of this. 31 people were arrested, with some coming from states as far away as
New York. See After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 28.
142 See “Transcript: Captain Ron Johnson Press Conference in Ferguson, Missouri, 2:21 a.m. 2014-08-19,”
Lincoln Madison, August 19, 2014, http://lincmad.blogspot.com/2014/08/transcript-capt-ron-johnsonpressconf.html as cited in After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 27-28.
143 Note: Shots were reported at 10:01 PM, 10:36 PM, 10:44 PM, 11:05 PM, and 1:14 AM. Ibid., p. 28.
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were later reported by the St. Louis Metropolitan PD. Another concern addressed at the
press conference was, “how some members of the media were physically positioning
themselves in relation to the police and protesters.” Captain Johnson asked for members
of the media to “keep clear of the roads” and for “them to be careful in their reporting.”144
The Missouri State Highway Patrol reported that for the evenings of August 19 and
August 20, protest groups decreased in size (to around 150 people) and that levels of
emotional volatility and tension also decreased.145 The night of August 20 was calmer
than previous nights, despite experiencing the injury of three officers, multiple threats on
the lives of police officers, and 47 arrested for “various illegal acts.” The decline in
tensions could be seen in the relaxed posture held by police officers and community
leaders, and some attribute this to the arrival of US Attorney General Eric Holder.146
Gov. Nixon officially started the process of withdrawing National Guard troops
from Ferguson on August 21, allowing for an increased sense of calm among community
leaders and demonstrators.147 The crowds were more peaceful but in the evening seven
officers were injured and while armed persons were reported, no shots fired were noted
that evening. August 21 saw about 300, largely peaceful, demonstrators around West
Florissant Avenue and Canfield Drive. Law enforcement took notice of 12 members of a

Lindsey Bever, “Media Making Up the Mob: Journalists amid Protesters in Ferguson, Missouri,” The
Washington Post, August 20, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/
08/20/media-making-up-the-mob-journalists-amid-protesters-inferguson-mo/.
145 Ibid., p. 28.
146 See also Alan Blinder and Campbell Robertson, “As Tension Eases on Ferguson’s Streets, Focus Turns
to Investigation,” The New York Times, August 20, 2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/21/us/ferguson-missouri-protests.html?_r=0.
147 See Office of Missouri Governor Jay Nixon, “Governor Nixon Orders the Missouri National Guard to
Begin Systematically Withdrawing from the City of Ferguson,” news release, August 21, 2014,
https://governor.mo.gov/news/archive/gov-nixon-orders-missourinational-guard-begin-systematicallywithdrawing-city-ferguson as cited in After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 28.
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local motorcycle club who took to the streets with the aim of “keeping the peace.”148
Once again, West Florissant Avenue was closed-off due to protester activity. August 22
was considered a lull by police officers, with zero protest-related arrests, and even fewer
demonstrators than the day before.149 A sense of normalcy had come back to
Ferguson,150 but officers recognized that the demonstrations were not over yet. This was
seen in the continued anger and list of demands151 from demonstrators to government
officials (e.g., “de-escalation of police militarization”).152 As West Florissant Avenue reopened, there was a noticeable decrease in the number of protesters at both demonstration
sites.153 The NAACP hosted another peaceful protest154 on August 23 and, despite six
arrests, the demonstrations continue to be relatively calm.155 It is worth noting that
officers assisted a nonprofit in delivering food to residents of the Canfield and
Northwinds apartment complexes.156 Even though six people were arrested, the evening
of August 23 did not experience random gunshots, objects being thrown at officers, or

See David McCormack, “All-Black ‘Outcast MC’ Biker Club Patrolling the Streets of Ferguson in a Bid
to Help Keep the Peace after Ten Nights of Unrest,” DailyMail.com, August 19, 2014,
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2729449/All-black-Outcast-MC-bikerclub-patrolling-streetsFerguson-bid-help-peace-nine-nights-unrest.html as cited in After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 29.
149 Statements came from anonymous interviews with police officers conducted by the COPS assessment
team.
150 Yamiche Alcindor, Larry Copeland, and Gary Strauss, “Calm Restored in Ferguson, Support Builds for
Officer,” USA Today, August 22, 2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/21/ missouriferguson-national-guard-withdraw/14395465/.
151 See Matt Sledge and Emily Kassie, “Ferguson Protesters Have Some Demands (VIDEO),” The
Huffington Post, August 22, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/22/ferguson-protest-d
emands_n_5701847.html as cited in After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 29.
152 See Durrie Bouscaren, “A Group of Ferguson Protesters Releases List of Demands, Calls for National
‘Walk Out,’” St. Louis Public Radio, August 22, 2014, http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/groupfergusonprotesters-releases-list-demands-calls-national-walk-out as cited in Ibid., p. 29.
153 Note: Demonstration sites included: West Florissant Avenue and at the Ferguson PD. See Ibid., p. 29.
154 Note: The NAACP urged DOJ to hold FPD and Officer Wilson accountable for Mr. Brown’s
death. Ibid., p. 29.
155 See “NAACP Holds Peaceful Protest in Ferguson,” KSDK.com, August 23, 2015,
http://www.ksdk.com/videos/news/local/2014/08/23/14509145/ as cited in Ibid., p. 29.
156 Note: The nonprofit, Crisis Aid International, was assisted by officers going door to door, delivering
food. See After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 29.
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any deployment of smoke or tear gas to disperse protesters. This calm continued, 157 and
the size of protesters continued to decrease from August 24 through August 25. Even as
events wound down and normalcy seemed to return to the streets, West Florissant
Avenue continued to have small groups of activists. Overnight, six additional people
were arrested for, primarily, failure to disperse. Daily protests still occurred at the
Ferguson PD. Michael Brown Sr. asked demonstrators to refrain from protesting during
the day of son’s funeral.158 On Monday, August 25, there were no protests or arrests
related to the demonstrations in Ferguson.159 Overall, Ferguson experienced no “loss of
life or serious injury to protesters” due to police responses over the 17 day period, despite
236 demonstration-related arrests being made (36 felonies and 200 misdemeanors).160
The cause of the protests and the response by law enforcement drew international
attention (e.g., Amnesty International America), inspired four separate Justice
Department reports, and helped continue the nationwide protest-movement against the
continued deaths of unarmed black Americans by the hands of (white) police officers. At
the time when federal reports were being made, there were no ‘best practices’ established
for handling a mass demonstration like the one Ferguson experienced, making the
findings and lessons important for police agencies all over the country. The first of the
reports covered the shooting death of Michael Brown in which it concluded that Officer
Darren Wilson was justified in his actions and did not violate Brown’s rights. This
announcement inspired further demonstrations out of anger and solidarity in support of
After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 29.
See Eyder Peralta, “At Michael Brown’s Funeral, A Call for a Day of Reckoning,” NPR.org, August 25,
2014, http://www.npr.org/blogs/ thetwo-way/2014/08/25/343082268/on-day-of-funeral-michaelbrownsfamily-calls-for-day-of-silence as cited in Ibid., p. 29.
159 See Jelani Cobb, “Between the World and Ferguson,” The New Yorker, August 26, 2014,
http://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/world-ferguson as cited in Ibid., p. 29.
160 After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 29.
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Michael Brown’s memory & family. The next was an after-action assessment report
from the DOJ’s office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) which found
the police’s heavy-handed response to the protest to be problematic in its attempts to
contain the demonstrations, among other reasons, for lacking de-escalation training and
efforts as well as being reactive rather than proactive in their aggressive-handling of the
mass demonstrations. This tactical response by the police is credited with limiting the
options for dealing with protesters without use of force and escalating the situation out of
the possibility for positive negotiations, leading to the violence and destruction most
Americans remembered from the news that August of 2014. The following narrative
describes key events and turning points.
Aside from casting a light on Ferguson’s unpleasant policing history, the DOJ
investigation into the FPD delved deep into the heart of Ferguson’s issues with how the
city was being run. The investigation found the city’s police and court institutions to have
widespread racial biases, for example, African Americans were found to account for 90%
of police officers’ reported use-of-force.161 The city of Ferguson had a specific focus on
generating municipal revenue, to which it used the FPD, the Ferguson Municipal Court,
and the office of the City Prosecuting Attorney. While the sources of community distrust
are disputed, the investigation team found that distrust in FPD is longstanding and a
result of the manner laws are enforced (i.e., “unnecessarily aggressive… at times
unlawful policing…”).162 Even though Ferguson’s population is 67% black, 93% of all

161

See Ibid. as cited in “Ferguson unrest: From shooting to nationwide protests,” British Broadcast
Company - News, August 10, 2015: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30193354.
162
Police & City Officials, and some Ferguson residents, contend the ‘public outcry’ originates from
“outside agitators” and not reflective of “real Ferguson residents.” This runs counter to the facts cited in
the report, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, March 4, 2015, p. 5.
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people arrested are black.163 The investigation found that FPD used to employ “modest
community policing efforts” but it had, in recent years prior, moved away from such
practices, thus widening the pre-existing division between FPD and the predominantly
black communities. In its place was an aggressive policing style, supported by the city,
that routinely violated multiple constitutional rights and was found to use discriminatory
intent adversely against African Americans.164 This focus on generating revenue
impacted law enforcement practices and culture. The investigation was critical of all
municipal institutions for systematically targeting (primarily poor) black Americans with
unreasonably high court fines and fees, among other discriminatory practices, designed to
increase the cities revenue. From 2014 to 2015 there was a million dollar increase in
revenue from public-safety fines, making up approximately 12% of the total budget, as
referenced in the Bloomberg News report from the City’s Finance Director. Despite this
still being up in the air, it is anticipated the revenue from fines and fees will make up
almost a quarter of the city’s budget (i.e., $3.09 million out of $13.26 million). In
addition to such a high focus on fines and the city’s orders to the FPD to aggressively
focus on municipal violations Ferguson has some of the most expensive fines and tickets
out of the surrounding municipalities.165
Out of all the reports which followed this incident, the COPS after-action
assessment was the most informative when it came to the problems faced by the police
and community during the ‘unrest,’ and reviewed their actions in an independent,
163

African Americans made up 96% of people arrested for outstanding municipal warrants as well as 95%
of the “manner of walking in roadway” charges. See “Ferguson unrest,” BBC-News.
164
Note: FPD law enforcement officials were found to have a pattern and practice of violating the First,
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See DOJ Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Ferguson Police
Department, p. 1.
165
One example is how the cost for “Weeds/Tall Grass” charges in Ferguson can range from $77-$102
while other municipalities have this charge, at its lowest, around $5.
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objective, and candid manner.166 While there were over 50 law enforcement agencies
who assisted in the response to Ferguson, four core Missouri law enforcement agencies
made up the primary focus of this review: the St. Louis County PD, the Missouri State
Highway Patrol, the St. Louis Metropolitan PD, and the Ferguson PD. This assessment
brought forward 48 findings and over 100 lessons applicable to law enforcement agencies
around the country. It additionally found six themes that permeated all actions of the
police response: inconsistent leadership, failure to understand endemic problems in the
community, a reactive rather than proactive strategy, inadequate communication and
information sharing, use of ineffective and inappropriate strategies and tactics, and a lack
of law enforcement response continuity. During the mass demonstrations associated with
the ’Ferguson Unrest,’ the immediate response from involved law enforcement agencies
was aggressive and reactive in nature, prompting domestic and international criticism.
A similar paramilitary response on the part of the police was seen again in what
has become known as the ‘Baltimore Uprising,’ and this was found to be equally
ineffective to promoting peace and nonviolence during the demonstrations following the
arrest & death of Freddie Gray in April of 2015 (just prior to the release of the COPS
Ferguson After-Action Assessment in May). Should the events in Baltimore that spring
had happened a month or two later, the lessons identified from the ‘Ferguson Unrest’
could have positively impacted, and possibly avoided, the levels of unlawful violence and
property destruction that the community experienced.
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US DOJ Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services, After-Action Assessment of the Police
Response to the 2014 Demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri, (Washington DC, 2015), https://ric-zaiinc.com/Publications/cops-p317-pub.pdf.
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CHAPTER THREE

NORTH MINNEAPOLIS OCCUPATION

Introduction to Case Study
The shooting of Jamar Clark on November 15, 2015 inspired 18 days of protests
in the form of occupying the space in front of and around the Fourth Precinct.
Immediately following the shooting incident, crowds of witnesses and community
members lined the streets as emotional tensions rose.167 Jamar Clark was shot in the
head168 just a few blocks from the MPD Fourth Precinct and it was on the lawn and street
in front of this police station, and briefly inside its front vestibule for the first three days,
where most of the organized demonstrations took place in the form of an occupation.
Police reform demonstrations spread into the street and the surrounding neighborhood for
an 18-day period which lasted from November 15th to December 3rd, 2015. In addition
to demonstrations, there were open fires, noisy gatherings, and encampments throughout
the 18 days, many of which violated municipal use-of-space ordinances. Despite the
clear violations of municipal law, there no arrests made by MPD, and it was not until the
early hours of December 3rd when they finally broke down the encampments in front of
the 4th Precinct in a peaceful manner. Even though the situation ended peacefully, the
city of Minneapolis still incurred costs around $1.15 million dollars, with a majority of
that total (around $1 million dollars) was for police overtime.

Emotional tensions were heightened by the uncertainty of whether Jamar Clark was handcuffed when he
was shot, and it was not until November 17 that it was reported that he was not handcuffed. See After
Action Report: MPD, p. 16.
168 Jamar Clark was shot in the head during the altercation but did not die until days after being in a coma.
167
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The protesters had mixed behaviors of primarily peaceful demonstrations during
the day followed by violent protest behavior at night (e.g., objects thrown at officers,
verbal harassment). Despite the suddenness of the protest situation, city and police
officials waited no time to call for an independent investigation into the shooting incident
of Jamar Clark by the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehensions (BCA).169 The
following day, Mayor Hodges contacted and requested for an additional independent
investigation into the shooting to be conducted by the Civil Rights Division of the
USDOJ as well as the Minnesota U.S. Attorney.170 Despite the “measured” response, the
After Action Report identified 36 findings and 71 recommendations.
Historical Context
The North Minneapolis Occupation of November 2015 was an event unlike the
any before seen by police or city officials,171 but was still an event a long time in the
making. Like the Plymouth Riots of 1967,172 the occupation was fueled by decades of
racially-charged tensions between minority community members and local government
combined with discriminatory police practices. North Minneapolis, MN has always been
the area where minority citizens have been pressured to live, but even so, the population

The independent investigation into the shooting was called for by Mayor Hodges at 9 AM of the
incident-day. See “BCA Called To Investigate Officer-Involved Shooting in North Mpls.,” CBS Minnesota,
November 15, 2015, http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/11/15/mplsofficer-shoots-wounds-suspectfollowing-struggle/ as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 12.
170 See The full content of the mayor’s letter can be viewed at “34 Adults, 8 Juveniles Arrested as Jamar
Clark Protest Shuts Down I-94,” Fox 9, last modified November 17, 2015,
http://www.fox9.com/news/50123489-story as cited in Ibid., p. 14.
171 There had been previous incidents of civil disturbances in the mid-1960s all the way up to 2002, but the
city had not previously encountered an occupation-style protest of a police precinct.
172 See Susan Marks, “July, 1967: Civil unrest on Plymouth Avenue,” MinnPost (July 24, 2017):
https://www.minnpost.com/mnopedia/2017/07/july-1967-civil-unrest-plymouth-avenue.
169
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of N. Minneapolis has historically been mostly white.173 It was not until after the ‘white
flight’ of the 1960s that African Americans largely settled down in N. Minneapolis. Ever
since the 1950s, Minneapolis has been ethnically and culturally diversifying itself
through an influx of immigrants from countries in Asia and Africa (e.g., Somalia,
Ethiopia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia). N. Minneapolis is certainly more ethnically diverse
than it was 60 years ago, with the most recent census data (2012-2016) showing the
population to be around 57% black, 17% Asian, 13% white, 9% Hispanic, and 4% of two
or more ethnicities.174
Minneapolis, Minnesota has long been known for its strong economy,
affordability, and liberal politics. The latter-19th century saw the population of
Minneapolis increase from an influx of predominantly Scandinavian immigrants. While
white citizens could take advantage of the city’s opportunities, the small black population
of Minneapolis was blocked from owning downtown homes, businesses, or enjoying
employment from milling or finance-related jobs.175 The COPS After-Assessment
Report cites from the Hennepin County Library that, historically, minority citizens of
Minneapolis have only been accepted in North Minneapolis.176 North Minneapolis (the
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North Minneapolis went from being around 75% white, 16% black, 2% Hispanic, 2% Native American,
1% Asian, and 4% of two or more races in 1980 to being 43% black, 30% white, 13% Asian, 8% Hispanic,
1% Native American, and 5% as other or of two or more races in 2010.
174
Data derived from US Census Bureau by Wilder Research, “Near-North Neighborhood,” Minnesota
Compass, 2018: http://www.mncompass.org/profiles/neighborhoods/minneapolis/near-north.
175
See United States. Department of Justice, Community Oriented Policing Services, COPS Office,
Maintaining First Amendment Rights and Public Safety in North Minneapolis: An After-Action Assessment
of the Police Response to Protests, Demonstrations, and Occupation of the Minneapolis Police
Department's Fourth Precinct, by Frank Straub, Hassan Aden, Jeffrey Brown, Ben Gorban, Rodney
Monroe, and Jennifer Zeunik, March 20, 2017, p. 8: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0836pub.pdf.
176
“A History of Minneapolis: 20th Century Growth and Diversity,” Hennepin County Library, archive
from April 21, 2012, accessed November 10, 2016,
http://web.archive.org/web/20120421143305/http://www.hclib.org/pub/search/
specialcollections/mplshistory/?id=26 as cited in United States. Department of Justice, Community
Oriented Policing Services, COPS Office, Maintaining First Amendment Rights and Public Safety in North
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‘north side’) has continued to be the focal point of racial and socio-economic division for
over fifty years and brings with it a rich history of civil unrest. In the 1960s, fueled by
decades of marginalization, there was a group of approximately 50 youth which
vandalized and looted ‘north side’ businesses. The following year of 1967, an event
known as the “Plymouth Riot” occurred in which another group of youths set fire to
multiple buildings on Plymouth Avenue, and unlike the previous year, the group did not
disperse once law enforcement arrived on scene. This riot lasted for three days and only
ended once 150 National Guard troops were deployed, but none of the dozen stores on
Plymouth Ave remained.177
Following the civil unrest of the mid-1960s, the city made efforts to try and
rebuild the area by donating an abandoned building to be opened as a community center,
The Way Opportunities Unlimited, Inc. (The Way). The Way served the ‘northside’
community through providing educational services to local youth and it became a symbol
of black empowerment and self-determination for those often forgot by city leadership. It
should be noted that The Way building burned down following the Plymouth Riot of
1967.178 In 1989, the organization that owned The Way lost its funding and the city took
possession of the building and turned it into the Fourth Precinct police station. The

Minneapolis: An After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to Protests, Demonstrations, and
Occupation of the Minneapolis Police Department's Fourth Precinct, by Frank Straub, Hassan Aden,
Jeffrey Brown, Ben Gorban, Rodney Monroe, and Jennifer Zeunik, March 20, 2017, https://ric-zaiinc.com/Publications/cops-w0836-pub.pdf.
177 Camille Venee Maddox, ‘The Way Opportunities Unlimited, Inc.’: A Movement for Black Equality in
Minneapolis, MN 1966-1970 (honors thesis, Emory University, 2013),
https://etd.library.emory.edu/view/record/pid/emory:d6v0d as cited in US DOJ, COPS Office, Maintaining
First Amendment Rights and Public Safety in North Minneapolis: An After-Action Assessment of the Police
Response to Protests, Demonstrations, and Occupation of the Minneapolis Police Department's Fourth
Precinct, p. 9.
178 In 1966, a group of 50 youth vandalized and looted multiple Plymouth Avenue businesses in North
Minneapolis. The following year saw a similar incident known as the “Plymouth Riot,” where groups of
youth set fire to buildings on Plymouth Avenue, but this incident lasted three days and the groups did not
disperse as they had the previous year when law enforcement arrived.
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symbolism and community-history of this building cuts deep into the contemporary
issues North Minneapolis residents have with their law enforcement. While it was
acknowledged to be well-intentioned by some community members, the conversion of
The Way into a police station was seen by some as a source of resentment and
contention. It is directly referenced in the report, an interview with a BLM Minneapolis
organizer on the symbolism of ‘black revolutionary love’ held by The Way building.179
In 2002 there was an incident of community violence in North Minneapolis that followed
the non-lethal shooting of a young boy as police officers conducted a drug raid on the
suspected house.180 It was reported that residents took out their anger by shouting and
throwing objects at police officers, and eventually through assaulting multiple news
reporters and damaging their vehicles. The occupation protest of 2015 was driven by
many of the same problems faced by the community in the 1960s: high rates of
unemployment, poverty, and criminal activity.
Narrative of Events
The November 15, 2015 shooting-incident of Jamar Clark in North Minneapolis
inspired an 18-day long occupation-style protest,181 the likes the Minneapolis Police
Department (MPD) had never before encountered.182 It garnered immediate local
attention, even though the incident took place around 1 AM, as witnesses and other

179

Jessie Hausman, “The Faces of the Fourth Precinct Protest,” Twin Cities Daily Planet, December 17,
2015, http://www.tcdailyplanet.net/fourth-precinct-protestprofiles/ as cited in Ibid., p. 9.
180
William Brandt, “Police shooting leads to violent protest,” Minnesota Public Radio, Aug. 23, 2002
available at: http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200208/23_williamsb_policemelee/.
181 David A. Graham, “How Did Jamar Clark Die?” The Atlantic, November 18, 2015,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/jamar-clark-is-the-next-great-police-brutalitycontroversy/416418/.
182 Straub et al., COPS, North Minneapolis After-Action Assessment, (2017) p. 1-85, https://ric-zaiinc.com/Publications/cops-w0836-pub.pdf.

45

community members lined Plymouth Avenue North.183 One of the reasons this event
drew so many people’s attentions was due to the how it was not clear if Jamar Clark was
handcuffed as he was shot, although it was later discovered he was not.184 It was reported
that 100-200 people started a march from the homicide scene two blocks down to the
Fourth Precinct station.185 It should be noted that the demonstrators who believed Clark
was handcuffed called for prosecution of the involved-officers. By 3 PM another
demonstration was organized, through social media, by BLM Minneapolis and the
Minneapolis chapter of the NAACP, that followed the same path marching as the
previous demonstration had. At this point demonstrators linked arms and formed a halfmile “No Cop Zone,”186 and as they chanted 12 BLM chapter members entered and
started an occupation inside of the precinct’s front vestibule. They listed five demands187
be met before they would leave the vestibule. Those in the occupation also refused to
attend the community meeting and listening session organized by the Urban League that
evening, and many who attended described it as tense and shared similar sentiments to
the remarks made by the active-protesters.188 After the meeting, attendees and other
community members joined the demonstration outside the police station, reportedly
See N. Minneapolis Background section on the history of Plymouth Avenue being a past site for civil
unrest in the 1960s (i.e., the Plymouth Riot of 1967) from After-Action Report: MPD.
184 Report of the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office Regarding the Shooting Death of Jamar Clark on
November 15, 2015 (Minneapolis, MN: Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, 2016),
http://www.hennepinattorney.org/~/media/Attorney/NEWS/2016/jamar-clark-case/report-of-hennepincounty-attorney-regarding-death-of-jamarclark-3-30-16.pdf?la=en.3 as cited in Ibid., p. 9.
Note: Coroner did not find the bruises on Clark’s wrists that would have occurred if he was handcuffed at
the time of the shooting.
185 Ibid., p. 12.
186 See “Police Precinct Occupied after Jamar Clark is ‘Executed’ while Handcuffed,” Unicorn Riot,
November 15, 2016, http://www.unicornriot.ninja/?p=2747.
187 BLM Vestibule Demands: (1) viewing the footage from the incident; (2) an independent investigation;
(3) media coverage of eye witness testimony (4) community oversight of police with full-disciplinary
power; and (5) a residency requirement for MPD officers. See After Action Report: MPD, p. 12.
188 Patience Zalanga, “Tense Community Meeting After Police Kill Minneapolis Man,” The Uptake,
November 18, 2015, http://theuptake.org/2015/11/18/tensecommunity-meeting-in-wake-of-police-killingminneapolis-man/.
183
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bringing the number of protesters up to 300-400.189 The first night saw protesters throw
rocks, bottles, and other objects as they surrounded the station, verbally harassed the
police officers, blocked the police vehicle exits, and destroyed police equipment (e.g.,
police cruisers tires slashed and windows of cruisers and the station itself were
broken/damaged).190
November 16 had a range of approximately 50-300 people throughout the day
protesting with a reported 300 people who marched towards downtown, up the I-94 W
ramp, and blocked five-lanes of the highway by linking arms to create another “No Cop
Zone.”191 This day’s protesters continued the call for having the video released as well as
for the prosecution of the involved officers and were made up by members of “BLM, the
NAACP Minneapolis, the Black Liberation Project, and unaffiliated community
members.”192 According to the report, that evening, between 9:30 PM and 10:30 PM,
protesters threw bottles and bricks over the fence targeting the officers and vehicles in the
back parking lot.193 On November 17 tents and canopies were set up as demonstrators
continued to occupy the front lawn,194 but no significant changes in protester numbers
were reported. That evening (from 5:30 PM to 7:30 PM), 10 members of Jamar Clark’s
family and 6 BLM members met with Mayor Betsey Hodges and relayed a few
requests195 that, if met, could put an end to the occupation.196 The mayor agreed to the
Janee Harteau, “18 Days Outside the Minneapolis Police Department’s 4th Precinct,” PowerPoint
presentation to Major Cities Chiefs Association, May 25, 2016. Reviewed by assessment team May–
November 2016.
190 After Action Report: MPD, p. 13.
191 “#Justice4Jamar Camp Expands; Minneapolis Residents Block I-94; Unicorn Riot Reporter & 40+
Others Arrested,” Unicorn Riot, November 16, 2015, http://www. unicornriot.ninja/?p=2775.
192 Ibid. as cited in After-Action Report: MPD, p. 14.
193 See “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by
assessment team April–November 2016 as cited in After-Action Report: MPD, p. 15.
194 Ibid., p. 16.
195 Requests to Mayor Hodges from Clark family and BLM: (1) for she (the mayor) to arrange culturally
appropriate grief counseling for members of the family and community; (2) convey to the BCA and
189
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first two but could not give a final decision regarding the third.197 During the day of
November 17, the protesters remained largely peaceful but by nighttime they had started
throwing rocks, bricks, and other debris over the precinct walls.198 In addition to this,
they made multiple attempts to breach the fences and barricades put up that morning and
damaged multiple vehicles belonging to residents of the neighborhood.199 Two of the
men occupying the vestibule attempted to gain entry in to the precinct lobby but were
unsuccessful. November 18 saw the erection of another five tents and two canopies for
food/commissary.200 The Urban League held a press conference with members of BLM
and the Clark family to officially demand for the release of the video, but the Clark
family also reached out to the demonstrators to maintain peaceful protests.201 Following
the press conference, the mayor met privately with two members of the family and six
from BLM to relay that she had kept her promises with the first two demands and wanted
an end to the occupation, but when she said she would not be able to publicly call for the
release of the video, the meeting ended.202 The vestibule was cleared at 2 PM and was
widely viewed by protesters as a “disproportionate [and militarized] response to their—to

USDOJ representatives the family’s wish to view the video privately; and (3) for her to publicly call for
any related-videos to be released.
196 After Action Report: MPD, p. 16.
197 See footnote 42.
198 See Bill Sorem and Michael McIntee, “Barricaded Police Station Symbol of Separate but Unequal
Minneapolis,” The Uptake, December 9, 2015, http://theuptake. org/2015/12/09/barricaded-police-stationsymbol-of-separate-but-unequalminneapolis/ as cited in Ibid., p. 16.
199 See “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses
to Protestor Requests,” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team
April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., 16.
200 Ibid., p. 17.
201 See Kate Raddatz, “Jamar Clark’s Family Calls For Peaceful Protest, Justice,” CBS Minnesota,
November 18, 2015, http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/11/18/jamarclarks-family-calls-for-peacefulprotest-justice/ as cited in Ibid., p. 17.
202 See “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses
to Protestor Requests,” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team
April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 17.
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that point, largely non-violent—occupation.”203 The dynamics of the demonstrators
changed from there on out and that evening, the occupation saw one of its most violence
points. It was from this point on that the situation-response effort expanded to the entire
department instead of just the Fourth Precinct.204 It should be noted that three city
councilmembers205 went to the occupation to participate and show support with their
constituents. The evening of November 18 experienced a growth in the number of
intensity of protesters and small numbers of protesters used “Molotov cocktails, bottles of
gasoline, and large cement bricks” to throw over the fencing and walls. Additionally,
protesters cut portions of fencing and barbed wire on the station’s west gate and
destroyed a monitoring camera set up by the police for the protest.206 During the violence
of the evening, 13 protesters marched to the mayor’s house to voice their displeasure for
how the vestibule-situation was handled. It was surprising when the mayor’s husband
answered the door, explained that the mayor had not been there, and invited them in to
talk for around 10 minutes.207
Later in the evening of November 19, a vigil was held for Clark in which the
mayor attended. This was also the day when three city councilmembers and the U.S.
Representative that represents the Minneapolis area joined representatives of BLM and
religious leaders for the continued call to release the video(s) pertaining the shooting of

See Assessment team interview with community member, May 5, 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 18.
See “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by
assessment team April–November 2016 as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 18.
205 Note: Councilmembers: Lisa Bender (Ward 10), Alondra Cano (Ward 9), and Cam Gordon (Ward 2).
206 See “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by
assessment team April–November 2016 as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 18.
207 See “Protestors: We Knocked On The Mayor’s Door, Her Husband Let Us In,” CBS Minnesota,
November 19, 2015, http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/11/19/ protesters-we-knocked-on-the-mayorsdoor-her-husband-let-us-in/ as cited in Ibid., p. 18.
203
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Clark.208 Despite the continued verbal harassment, November 19 was much calmer than
the previous night and did not have any reported significant changes in the number of
demonstrators, as was true for the number of participants on November 20.209 Although
there was an incident involving protesters threatening officers with lit Molotov cocktails
as well as an intoxicated women who attempted to drive through the back fence. While it
remained unclear whether the intoxicated women had been involved with the protest,
these events on November 20 created and raised tensions between demonstrators.210 A
vigil was held at 4 PM with the NAACP national president as the guest of honor, who
reinforced the importance of maintaining peaceful protests as they fought for justice.211
While physical violence ended that day, verbal harassment of officers (particularly those
who were African American) did not.212 This marked the most peaceful night of the
occupation yet. The mornings and early afternoons of November 21 and 22 both
experienced around 50 protesters outside the precinct station. Those numbers increased
to approximately 200 each evening, but no arrests or violence was reported.213 A meeting
between the governor, US Representative, and BLM representatives took place to discuss
ending the occupation. Following the meeting, the governor called for a USDOJ
investigation into any civil rights violations that may have occurred during the

See “Ellison, Mpls. Councilmembers Stand With BLM In Quest For Video Release,” CBS Minnesota,
November 19, 2015, http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/11/19/ ellison-mpls-councilmembers-stand-withblm-in-quest-for-video-release/ as cited in Ibid., p. 21.
209 After Action Report: MPD, p. 20-23.
210 See Bill Keller, “SUV Rams Fourth Precinct Gate, 2 Arrested for Jamar Clark Vandalism,” Fox 9,
November 20, 2015, http://www.fox9.com/news/51959667-story as cited in Ibid., p. 22.
211 See “Protestors Hold Candlelight Vigil For Jamar Clark At 4th Precinct,” CBS Minnesota, November
20, 2015, http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/11/20/policeon-alert-at-4th-precinct-candlelit-vigil-forjamar-clark/ as cited in Ibid., p. 22.
212 See Libor Jany, “Minneapolis’ Black Police Officers Walk a Cultural Tightrope,” Star Tribune, March
5, 2016, http://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-black-policeofficers-walk-a-culturaltightrope/371135461/ as cited in Ibid.
213 See “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by
assessment team April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., p.24-25.
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occupation214 and called for special legislation aimed at addressing the racial disparities
felt in North Minneapolis & the state of Minnesota.215 On November 22, a meeting was
held between the Mayor’s Office and BLM in which they agreed to end the occupation
on Tuesday, November 24.216
During the day, a meeting took place with city officials and demonstrators whose
goal was to finalize a timeline for ending the occupation, but an agreement could not be
reached. No major changes in numbers occurred on November 23, but tensions were
raised after a slow police response to the non-lethal shooting of five demonstrators by a
small group of “supposed” white supremacists.217 The counter-protesters, (unofficially)
identified by a BLM organizer and the Minneapolis NAACP chapter president as white
supremacists, were three white men and one woman who were wearing ski-masks while
live streaming arguments they were having with protesters. Eventually a small group of
protesters pursued them away from the area outside the MPD 4th Precinct building before
one of them, later identified as Allen Scarsella, pulled out a gun and fired into the
dissipating group of protesters. This act of violence committed against BLM protesters
inspired greater support from existing and new members as a means of fighting against
the efforts of (perceived) white supremacists.218 The day after the shooting, November
24, the communications chair of the Minneapolis NAACP went on CNN for an interview
See Phil Helsel, “Minnesota Governor Calls for Federal Review of Police Actions,” NBC News,
November 22, 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/minnesotagovernor-calls-federal-reviewpolice-actions-n467746 as cited in Ibid., p. 24.
215 See “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses
to Protestor Requests,” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team
April–November 2016 as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 24.
216 See “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses
to Protestor Requests,” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team
April–November 2016 as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 24.
217 After Action Report: MPD, p. 26.
218 Kutz, “How Black Lives Matter came back stronger after white supremacist attacks,” Waging
Nonviolence, (November 30, 2015): https://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/black-lives-matter-came-backstronger-white-supremacist-attacks/.
214
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and claimed that the “MPD was facilitating injustices”219 and “purposely [delayed] their
response to the shooting victims.”220 There was supposed to be a meeting between
officials and activists to put the occupation to an immediate end, but certain occupation
leaders refused to attend and the protests continued.221 By 2 PM that day, it is reported
that 1000 protesters marched from the Fourth Precinct to City Hall, again, demanding the
videos of the shooting be released.222 During this time, an additional 500 protesters
remained at the Fourth Precinct for a concert.223 When protesters returned from the
march some became violent, throwing projectiles at officers and squad cars.224
Jamar Clark’s funeral was held on November 25 at the Shiloh Temple
International Ministries between 10 AM - 1 PM, and had hundreds of people in
attendance.225 The president of the Urban League of Minneapolis spoke at the funeral,
reiterating the points made by the US Representative and Clark’s family to end the
occupation.226 These notions were countered by another pastor who promoted a rally
happening after the funeral, how the video had not been released yet, and that there were

See “Minnesota NAACP Leader ‘Raeisha Williams’ Claims Police Are Behind The Shootings Of
Black! 2015,” YouTube, published November 24, 2015, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=pvzqKzKdn54 as cited in COPS, Minneapolis After-Action, p. 27.
220 See “BLM: Fourth Precinct Occupation Will Continue Despite Shootings,” CBS Minnesota, November
24, 2015, http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/11/24/blmfourth-precinct-occupation-will-continue-despiteshootings/ as cited in Ibid., p. 27.
221 See “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses
to Protestor Requests,” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team
April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 27.
222 See Mary Lynn Smith and Claude Peck, “Five people were shot near Black Lives Matter protest site,”
StarTribune, November 24, 2015, http://www.startribune.com/severalpeople-were-shot-near-black-livesmatter-protest-site/353121881/ as cited in Ibid., p. 27.
223 See “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by
assessment team April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 28.
224 See “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by
assessment team April–November 2016 as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 28.
225 See “Funeral for Jamar Clark draws hundreds of Minneapolis mourners as protests against police
continue,” New York Daily News, November 25, 2015, http://
www.nydailynews.com/news/national/jamar-clark-funeral-draws-hundredsminneapolis-mourners-article1.2447107 as cited in Ibid., p. 29.
226 Ibid.
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still people who wanted to fight for the justice Clark deserved.227 After the funeral,
approximately 100 protesters returned to the Fourth Precinct.228 Some leaders of the
protests started a call for more social services aimed at assisting those who came to the
occupation out of necessity for food and shelter. There were also trainings, speak-outs,
and concerts held by protest leaders which all had a supply of food.229 It was at this point
in the occupation that the demographics of the demonstrators became increasingly
diverse, with many newcomers arriving from outside North Minneapolis. Thanksgiving
Day saw 100 protesters put on a “Blacksgiving” celebration which rejected the historical
underpinnings of violence and injustice associated with Thanksgiving.230 Community
members of North Minneapolis came out to donate heater, tents, and traditional
Thanksgiving food to the demonstrators.231 A meeting was held Thanksgiving Day
between the mayor, with the negotiation of terms assisted by USDOJ CRS personnel, and
the presidents of the NAACP and Minnesota chapters. The terms agreed to by everyone
was the removal of three large tents the next day by 8 AM.232
By 8 AM the November 27, the three agreed-upon tents were not removed,
although no significant police activity was reported aside from a large thrown rock that
broke a window on the west side of the precinct.233 Through the mediation of two CRS

See Assessment team interview with community member, May 4, 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 29.
Ibid.
229 Ibid.
230 See “#BlacksGiving,” Facebook event hosted by Black Lives Matter Minneapolis, November 26, 2015,
https://www.facebook.com/events/1506059879687832/ as cited in Ibid., p. 31.
231 See Beatrice Dupuy and Liz Sawyer, “Black Lives Matter Protesters Gather for Thanksgiving Feast,”
StarTribune, November 27, 2015, http://www.startribune.com/ black-lives-matter-protesters-prepare-forthanksgiving-day-feast/354949271/#1 as cited in Ibid., p. 31.
232 See “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses
to Protestor Requests,” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team
April–November 2016 as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 31
233 See Incident Action Plan: 4th Precinct Security Detail 11/25/2015 1600 to 11/26/2015 1600
(Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team August–
November 2016 as cited In Ibid., 32.
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representatives, the mayor and her Chief of Staff met with the NAACP Minneapolis and
Minnesota chapter presidents to discuss the “police reform and equity” items of
NAACP’s agenda in exchange for the encampments’ fires being put out.234 November 27
saw a general decline in the number of protesters at the occupation, with around 40
during the day and only 20 overnight.235 This is partially due to a combined number of
80 protesters demonstrating at two other events that day.236 On November 28, there was
a reported 80 protesters during the day with approximately 10-15 that stayed overnight.
The mayor and the presidents of both NAACPS chapters participated in eight hours of
negotiations with regards to the removal of ordinance-violating fire pits. She suggested
acquisitioning a legal permit for the demonstrators to bring their own heaters to use in the
precinct parking lot across the street.237 The negotiations ended when the fires had not
put out. No major changes occurred the next day, November 29, but BLM negotiators
did release a list of demands238 in which, among others, demanded the occupation be
allowed to continue through December.239 Through CRS representatives, the mayor
continued her efforts to negotiate an end for the occupation, but when all BLM demands
See “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses
to Protestor Requests,” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team
April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 32.
235 See “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by
assessment team April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 32.
236 Note: A group of 50 protesters went to march downtown to advocate raising the minimum wage, and the
other group of 30 went to participate at the “Solidarity with the Northside” march on Minneapolis’ south
side to the Third Precinct. See “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department,
2015). Reviewed by assessment team April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 32.
237 See “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses
to Protestor Requests,” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team
April–November 2016 as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 33.
238 Other demands include: “That Minnesota law be changed to enhance civilian review of police
departments; changes to Minneapolis’ contract with the Federation; that prosecutors charge those arrested
in connection with the shooting of the five demonstrators with terrorism; a federal investigation into the
shootings of the demonstrators; and that charges for all involved in blocking I-94 W be dropped. See Ibid.,
p. 34.
239 See “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses
to Protestor Requests,” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team
April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 34.
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could not be met, the meeting ended.240 While there was no significant police activity
reported on November 30, “the mayor, US Representative, a Minnesota Dept. of Human
Rights executive, and multiple former and current elected city councilmembers” stood
together in a call for an end to the occupation.241 With growing efforts from certain
community members and government officials to end the occupation, BLM and the
NAACP chapter president for Minneapolis responded by doubling-down, refusing to
leave until the videos were released. As rumors of an “imminent” police raid aimed at
ending the occupation circulated,242 tensions rose as physical fortifications were made to
the camp (i.e., “more permanent and robust structures”).243
MPD planned on removing the occupation’s encampment at 4 AM on the
morning of December 1, but it was called off after the plan got leaked.244 No major
protest incidents occurred on December 1 aside from the 30-35 remaining protesters and
the group of clergy and BLM members who marched to city hall at 4 PM to demand the
release of the videos.245 The governor called out on protesters to end the occupation and
to “look at the bigger picture and rebuild the community together.”246 It is notable that
the four men involved with the shooting of five protesters were charged. One with five

Ibid.
See Mayor Betsy Hodges statement, “A Message from the Community to End the Occupation,” posted
November 30, 2015, https://mayorhodges.com/2015/11/30/ a-message-from-the-community-to-end-theoccupation/ as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 35.
242 “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by
assessment team April–November 2016 as cited Ibid., p. 35
243 After Action Report: MPD Fourth Precinct Protests (Minneapolis, Minnesota: Minneapolis Police
Department, 2015) as cited in Ibid., p. 35.
244 See Janee Harteau, “18 Days Outside the Minneapolis Police Department’s 4th Precinct,” PowerPoint
presentation to Major Cities Chiefs Association, May 25, 2016. Reviewed by assessment team May–
November 2016 as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 36.
245 See “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by
assessment team April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 36.
246 See Pat Kessler, “Gov. Dayton Calls For Fourth Precinct Protesters To ‘Move On,’” CBS Minnesota,
December 1, 2015, http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/12/01/daytonproposes-15m-in-special-session-toaddress-racial-disparities-in-mpls/ as cited in Ibid., p. 36.
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counts of second-degree assault and one count of second-degree rioting, and the
remaining three each got one count of second-degree rioting.247 The divide on whether to
end the occupation between the Clark family and the demonstrators continued to widen
as December 2 progressed. Traditional faith leaders called for the occupation to end but
emerging community leaders, largely BLM, continued their refusal to leave until the
video was released.248 The number of protesters remained the same as MPD finalized
their plans to end the occupation and clear the encampment the next morning. 249 Early in
the morning of December 3 (at 3:45 AM) a combination of officers, city crews,
firefighters, and private contractors cleared the encampment, opened the road, and gave
35 people orders to disperse.250 While the occupation ended, protesters moved to City
Hall to continue conveying the message that the protests would continue.251 This paper
turns now to examining the extent to which the theories regarding violence and protest
illuminate the differences between the events of Ferguson and North Minneapolis.
The balancing act for law enforcement in upholding First Amendment rights and
public safety has become even more difficult given the heightened tensions surrounding
criminal justice reform protests and the greater scrutiny put on them by their community

See “Timeline of the Jamar Clark Case” (see note 58). As of December 13, 2016, one of the men
pleaded not guilty to assault and riot charges and the other three men have not yet entered pleas to their riot
charges; see Associated Press, “Lakeville Man Pleads Not Guilty in Shooting of Jamar Clark Protesters,”
December 13, 2016, http://kstp.com/news/allen-scarsella-jamar-clark-protester-shooting/4170287/ as cited
in After Action Report: MPD, p. 36.
248 See Reg Chapman, “As 4th Precinct Protest Continues, Police Report Slower Emergency Response
Times,” CBS Minneapolis, December 2, 2015, http://minnesota.cbslocal. com/2015/12/02/as-4th-precinctprotest-continues-police-report-sloweremergency-response-times/ as cited in Ibid., p. 37.
249 See “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by
assessment team April–November 2016 as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 37.
250 See Janee Harteau, “18 Days Outside the Minneapolis Police Department’s 4th Precinct,” PowerPoint
presentation to Major Cities Chiefs Association, May 25, 2016. Reviewed by assessment team May–
November 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 37.
251 See Douglas Fehlen, “Community and City Seek Correct Response After Jamar Clark’s Death,”
Camden Community News, January 1, 2016, http://www.camdennews. org/2016/01/community-and-cityseek-correct-response-after-jamar-clarks-death/ as cited in Ibid., p. 38.
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members as well as the local and national media outlets. This balance becomes even
more difficult when law enforcement is faced with new and unique situations in which
demonstrators defy prior-expectations by employing new and novel re-combinations of
older protest tactics.252

New or novel re-combinations of older protest tactics are a means of tactical innovation emerging. See
Wang and Soule (2016).
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CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS

Micro-Contextual Findings
Ethnic Diversity (C1)
DiPasquale and Glaeser 1998 note a connection between a higher incidence and
intensity of riots and the community-level variable of ethnic-diversity. Both Ferguson,
MO and N. Minneapolis, MN have become more ethnically diverse since the first few
decades of ‘white flight,’ but North Minneapolis, MN has been steadily diversifying its
demographics beyond margins of ‘black and white,’ with more recent influxes of
Hispanics, multi-ethnic people, and immigrants from a variety of African and Asian
countries. Based on ethnic-diversity, this theory would expect a higher chance of
violence and riots to occur in North Minneapolis rather than in Ferguson. Despite this,
the incidence and intensity of violence and rioting were reportedly much higher in
Ferguson (2014) than they were in North Minneapolis (2015). I would argue that North
Minneapolis would have exhibited greater violence, and possibly riots, if the only factor
involved was ethnic-diversity. While ethnic-diversity has some role in understanding
community-violence, it alone cannot explain the differences between Ferguson and North
Minneapolis in how they reacted to police violence.
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Chart 7: Findings and Micro-Context Theories

Theory Name (C1, 2, 3)
C1: ‘Ethnic Diversity’ Theory

C2: ‘Community History of Violence’
Theory
C3: ‘Area/Policing Culture’ Theory

Findings
-Ferguson, MO has become more
ethnically-diverse.
-N. Minneapolis has become more
ethnically-diverse.
-Ferguson and St. Louis, MO do not have
much history of community violence.
-N. Minneapolis has a long history of
community violence.
-Ferguson had a culture of aggressive and
discriminatory policing against African
Americans.
-North Minneapolis had a policing culture
of professionalism yet it still exhibited a
sub-culture of policing discrimination
against African Americans/minority
citizens.
-Ferguson was found to have high degrees
of violence, large number of behaviors
considered prohibited, and low levels of
communication.
-North Minneapolis was found to have low
degrees of violence, small number of
behaviors considered prohibited, and higher
levels of communication.

Prior History of Community Violence (C2)
Olzak, Shanahan, and McEeaney 1996 argue that a prior-history of communityviolence is associated with an increased likelihood of community-violence occurring in
the future. Ferguson, MO is a suburb whose racial demographics have shifted heavily in
the past 20 years, from predominantly white to black, and incidentally has not endured a
“rich” history of community-level violence. Unlike places like 1960s Detroit, MI and
Newark, NJ, the midwestern region of St. Louis, MO never experienced any major
incidents of racially-charged civil unrest or rioting up until 2014. North Minneapolis,
MN (the “Northside”) has long history of being the only area where minority citizens are
accepted and from this, it comes without surprise that, it has experienced its share of
59

community violence. The ‘Prior-History of Community Violence’ theory contends that
the likelihood of community-level violence would be higher in North Minneapolis, MN
than in Ferguson, MO. The 17 days of mass demonstrations in Ferguson (2014)
exhibited greater levels of community-level violence than in North Minneapolis (2015)
during the 18 days of occupation and protests.
Because of Ferguson’s lacking history of community-level violence, police were
caught off-guard to a lack of precedence that allowed for such high levels of protester and
policing violence to occur compared to other cities around the United States which
largely protested peacefully.253 Racial-disparities had fueled tensions between FPD and
the community members for decades and Ferguson had not experienced any release of
that tension through previous incidents of community-level violence. This could have led
to the initially-aggressive and surprising nature of the Ferguson crowds and
demonstrators. The FPD was unprepared to deal with the mass demonstrations, in part,
because of the community’s lack of violent demonstrations within the previous 20 years,
which would have provided actionable-precedence for law enforcement.254 This
procedural unpreparedness mixed with the increasingly-aggressive nature of the
demonstrations prompted a reactive and repressive response from law enforcement (i.e.,
aggressive arrest tactics, military-style equipment, use of canines).
For the same reasons, I would argue that the North Minneapolis, MN protests
remained peaceful on a community-level scale of violence (i.e., because they had priorexperience with community-level demonstrations). While MPD initially underestimated
An example of this was seen when protests in NYC, following the death of Eric Garner, remained
peaceful but protests in Berkeley turned violent multiple days in a row.
254 One of the law enforcement supervisors, interviewed by the assessment team, was quoted saying, “In
over 20 years of working here, this crowd was unlike anything I had ever seen. See After Action Report:
Ferguson, p. 7-8.
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the strength and duration of the protests, they were better suited to deal with the protests,
in part, because of their past experiences dealing with mass demonstrations. While there
was violent behavior exhibited during the November 2015 Minneapolis 4th Precinct
Occupation protest because a confrontation was not made (i.e., the spark that ignites
violence) and violent behavior was not established (i.e., rioting/looting did not occur),
North Minneapolis has a lower probability for the occurrence of annual protests (i.e.,
commemorating events around Jamar Clark’s death) from turning into riots. The effect
of an initial riot greatly increases the chance for future violence but if efforts can be
altered into capitalizing on pre-existing solution(s) (e.g., reforming policing policies,
improving community relations) to assist in preventing the start of violent behavior in
BLM-affiliated protests, there is potential for minimizing the likelihood for the
recurrence of riots and the many costs which they bring.
Past Law Enforcement Practices (C3)
The context of each locations’ law enforcement practices and relationship to their
communities prior to each incident may illuminate the difference in reactions to police
violence between Ferguson, MO and North Minneapolis, MN. The overarching cultures
of an area or state can additionally help explain the different reactions to police. Missouri
is a border-state between the North and South, long referred to as the “Gateway to the
West,” and it is from this that has allowed for the varying cultures and traditions which
have continually fed racial tensions in the part of America. There are two primary
Missourian cultures, one more reflective of a slave-state (i.e., the Ozarks) and one
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reflective of a northern-state (i.e., the big cities of Missouri).255 The Ozarks spread from
the Arkansas border all the way up into the southern suburbs of St. Louis.256 While there
is a strong culture of anti-black sentiment, certain parts of Missouri (i.e., Kansas City,
MO during the Civil Rights Movement) have had an equally long history of African
American resistance to those sentiments.257 Even when areas of Missouri seem accepting
of others,258 there is a discomfort felt by locals when the discussion of racism arises. This
has been attributed to a popular sentiment among locals that if issues of race are not
discussed, they will eventually go away. This aspect of Missourian culture greatly
reflects onto their law enforcement and helps illuminate why tensions went on for so
long, why black residents of Ferguson were so quick to start protesting, and why the
police response was so reactive and aggressive. There were no established best practices
for handling the “Ferguson Unrest” at the time, so it follows logically that they would
respond to anti-police protests in the similar manner (i.e., aggressive policing utilizing
military-style equipment and tactics) which started them in the first place (i.e., aggressive
use-of-force leading to officer involved shooting).
Minnesota culture derives primarily from the Scandinavian and German heritage,
consisting of good manners, strong family ties, as well as an insular sense of communities

Missouri has an “Ozark” culture of anti-black racism and white supremacy, but it also has the housing
segregation and “its attendant social ills” of a northern-state. See Marans and Stewart, “Why Missouri Has
Become The Heart of Racial Tension In America,” The Atlantic, Nov. 16, 2015:
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ferguson-mizzou-missouri-racialtension_us_564736e2e4b08cda3488f34d.
256 It should be noted that the Ozarks do not extend to the suburb of Ferguson, MO.
257 Missouri also a rich history and tradition of jazz, blues, and barbeque associated with the region.
258 It has been noted that the “Ozarks” have two differing cultures (both predominantly white): (1) the
traditional white supremacist culture; and (2) a more-accepting white, gay culture which still struggle as a
community to deal with issues of racism. See Morris, “For Two Ozarks Communities, A Stark Contrast in
Culture,” National Public Radio, May 12, 2014: https://www.npr.org/2014/05/12/310998299/for-twoozarks-communities-a-stark-contrast-in-culture.
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(i.e., those being made up of those with “shared beliefs”).259 While Minnesota helps lead
refugee resettlement efforts, the state is still largely homogenous. Even where there is
diversity in most of Minnesota, the demographics for whites are still usually higher than
the national average.260 This insular nature of Minnesotans allows a comfortable life to
those homegrown, but at the cost of alienating newcomers.261 It should be noted that the
population-ratio of those born in-state and those from out of state have changed
dramatically compared to what they were 30-40 years ago (90%-10% to 70%-30%), but it
has been noticed that this insular nature can especially have a negative effect on retaining
minority professionals.262 Minnesotans’ strong sense of loyalty to their community
allowed for the crowds to grow so quickly and become so hostile and emotional.
Minnesota additionally has a strong culture of professionalism (i.e., holding
oneself to the highest standard in everything whenever possible) and its importance in
preventing large civil disturbances was made case-in-point throughout the Fourth
Precinct Occupation of November 2015. It was from the professionalism of city and
police leadership that assisted to keep the North Minneapolis occupation from escalating
into violent riots.263 This professionalism was directly mentioned in the after-action
report in how MPD officers consistently responded with resilience to the harassment and,
the occasional, assault of hostile demonstrators.264 This mentality is also applicable to
I would argue that this [tradition] is related to North Minneapolis, MN being the historically ‘minority’
section of the city, as well as the prominence of white supremacist chapters downtown in its earlier history.
260 Yuen, “Newcomers say it’s ‘nice,’ but not warm,” Minnesota Public Radio News, March 12, 2012:
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2012/03/12/outsiders1-is-minnesota-nice-to-newcomers
261 Ibid.
262 It is described that this “coldness” to those of different ethnicities or cultures are based less out of apathy
and more of a lack of awareness to other cultures. On the flip side, most Minnesotans are willing to accept
others (from a distance) into the community (e.g., jobs) but so long as they do not have to think about the
other person’s culture. As described in the article, “Minnesotans are generous, but detached.” See Ibid.
263 After Action Report: MPD, p. VIII.
264 During MPD officers’ long-shifts, over the 18-day period, they would not be able to leave the building
unless on perimeter duty. Ibid., p. VII-VIII.
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BLM protesters’ actions in the form of training sessions put on by Training for Change in
October 2015, where demonstrators learned about, “the skills to confront challenges and
facilitate difficult moments.”265 After the occupation camp had been cleared, on
December 3, Police Chief Harteau sent an email to all MPD officers thanking them for all
their dedication and how she was proud that, “we lead the way in best practices in 21st
Century policing.”266 At the time of the North Minneapolis Occupation, new best
practices focused on community-oriented policing had been established267 and circulated
throughout the law enforcement community regarding response efforts to mass
demonstrations similar to the “Ferguson Unrest.” While the protest response from MPD
leadership was professional and maintained strict focused on ending the situation
peacefully, low officer-diversity coupled with the ‘everyday policing’ culture of racial
discrimination, excessive use-of-force, and little to no consequences for certain unlawful
acts is what led to the shooting of Jamar Clark and the ensuing protests. One of the
protest leaders, Nekima Levy-Pounds, commented to a local news outlet after the release
of the report describing the situation as, “a natural outcome of decades of police
misbehavior… and rifts in city government.”268 The cultures of each area seem to be
related to the policing models implemented during each of the protest incidents and those,
in turn, effected the amount of violence experienced overall.

Celia Kutz, “How Black Lives Matter came back stronger after white supremacist attacks,” Waging
Nonviolence (November 30, 2015): https://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/black-lives-matter-came-backstronger-white-supremacist-attacks/.
266 See Minneapolis Police Department internal email, reviewed by assessment team August–November
2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 38.
267 By the President’s Taskforce on 21st Century Policing.
268 Belz and Jany, “Federal review: City response to 4th Precinct protests was ‘peaceful and measured’
despite lack of communication,” Star Tribune (March 20, 2017): http://www.startribune.com/federalreview-city-response-to-4th-precinct-protests-was-peaceful-and-measured-despite-lack-ofcommunication/416619743/.
265
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Protest Policing Findings
Threat-Repression Theory (P1)
Three primary social movement paradigms contend that certain protest
characteristics, and combinations thereof, can been linked to a heightened probability of
protest repression and/or violence occurring but according to the threat-based theory (per
Earl 2003),269 movements can “threaten” authority figures through characteristics such as
the protesters’ goals, number of protesters, and their implementation of either new,
multiple, or confrontational protest tactics.270 The 17 days of demonstrations that
occurred in Ferguson, MO exhibited many of these “threatening” protest characteristics.
The speed at which the number of protesters grew consistently took law enforcement offguard, appeared “threatening,” and regularly prompted repressive and tactical police
responses. The “Ferguson Unrest” saw an unprecedented use of social media in tandem
with traditional (nonviolent) protest tactics (e.g., marches, vigils, chanting, sit-ins), which
it utilized to strengthen the movement’s momentum and take advantage of law
enforcement’s lack of preparation. While many of the daytime protesters remained
peaceful, confrontational and violent tactics were commonly utilized following the
occurrence of police-repression and, more commonly, throughout the nighttime
demonstrations. Multiple protest factions, with varying tactics and goals, operated during
the demonstrations, making it even more difficult for law enforcement to respond
uniformly. Peaceful and violent protesters both wanted justice for Brown’s death (i.e.,
prosecution of the involved-officer along with police reform measures), but it was from
Thomas N. Ratliff, “On the Stage of Change: A Dramaturgical Approach to Violence, Social Protests,
and Policing Styles in the U.S.,” (PhD diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2011), 1415.
270 Characteristics linked to threatening authority figures are derived from the following: Bromely and
Shupe 1983; Davenport 2000; McAdam 1982; and Wisler and Guigni 1999 as cited in Ibid.
269
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the radical goals of violence-oriented factions (i.e., “militants” targeting police and
looters targeting community businesses) that promoted a “threatening” perspective
among law enforcement and city officials.
The “Ferguson Unrest” had many (not clearly distinguishable) groups/factions
which participated in the August 2014 demonstrations, making it increasingly difficult for
law enforcement to respond effectively in a uniform-manner. There were four primary
factions, each with varying tactics and goals: “militants,” looters, peaceful protesters, and
the elderly.271 “Militants” and looters were the primary users of violence and
confrontational tactics during the nights of protest following Michael Brown’s death.272
Growth in group-size was found to have a connection with “militants” and looters
increasing the severity of their confrontational tactics. After August 12 and 13, large
influxes of people from other regions started coming into Ferguson and started to make
up large portions of these more-violent factions.273 Those who were a part of these
factions were considered radical by authority figures and saw their goals to be, by using
violence when necessary, standing up to ‘the [white] system’ while “getting back
justice,” with reasoning either for the killing of Brown or just for how they feel the
system had mistreated them.274
The faction of “peaceful protesters” tend to be the minority-group in the streets
after nightfall, whose goals are more widely accepted as they aim to non-violently

Emily Wax-Thibodeaux and DeNeen L. Brown, “Ferguson protesters: The peaceful, the elders, the
looters, and the ‘militants,’” Washington Post, August 18, 2014:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ferguson-protesters-the-peaceful-the-elders-the-looters-and-themilitants/2014/08/18/d6be1262-26f3-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html?utm_term=.da52088a1b08.
272 COPS, Ferguson After-Action. Note: Primary difference between the two violent factions is that:
“militants” focused on committing violence while also looting, and the looters focused on stealing and
criminal activity with the occasional use of violent force.
273 Ibid., p. 18.
274 See interviews with “militants” from Wax-Thibodeaux and Brown, “Ferguson Protesters.”
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confront the issue of continued shootings of African Americans while positively
impacting Ferguson, MO.275 The “peaceful” group is similarly made up of people from
all over, although many were noted as self-described activists who participated in the
Occupy Movement.276 One of the non-violent groups sets up in the neighborhood and
distributes water and fruit and is led by music producer Ronnie Natch.277 Each day
members of this group are dispatched to clean up trash and broken glass around the
affected neighborhoods. The other group is the elderly, an example of this is how Malik
Shabazz, national president of Black Lawyers for Justice, goes out to keep the peace each
night as he walks down West Florissant Avenue with a megaphone telling young people
to return home.278 Many of this group more often attend demonstrations and speeches in
the daytime but are more reluctant (out of fear for safety or health) to remaining active
into the night. Keeping the peace and promoting love over fear and hate are the primary
goals for this group (the elderly involved with the Ferguson protests), but they serve a
special role in the attempt of minimizing the negative influences that often occur due to
younger protesters, primarily at night. It is still not clearly understood why, but it has
been noted that the likelihood of experiencing police violence declines with age.279 This
pattern could prove useful for elderly activists by giving them a heightened-role when it
comes to maintaining peace between younger protesters and police officers.
This theory predicts Ferguson demonstrators to be viewed as “threatening” to
authority figures and for them to experience police repression. Due to the protesters’
goals, numbers, and tactics, protesters involved with the “Ferguson Unrest” were seen to
Ibid.
Ibid.
277 Ibid. (Interview with Ronnie Natch).
278 Ibid. (Interview with Malik Shabazz).
279 See Rory Kramer, Brianna Remster, Camille Z. Charles, “Black Lives and Police Tactics Matter,”
Contexts, Vol 16, Issue 3 (October 2017): p. 20-25, https://doi.org/10.1177/1536504217732048.
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be “threatening” by law enforcement, throughout the 17 days, and this led to consistent
instances of protest-repression in-line with predicted results.
The occupation and protests of North Minneapolis, MN saw large numbers of
demonstrators who repeatedly outnumbered law enforcement as they surrounded the
MPD Fourth Precinct. The 18 days of demonstrations experienced new combinations of
protest tactics (i.e., the mix of traditional marching, chanting, and sit-ins with a “shanty
town” occupational set-up outside the Fourth Precinct) as well as the use of multiple
tactics at once. Confrontational tactics were regularly used but most violent protest
behavior (e.g., objects thrown at officers) was exhibited during the evening. While the
demands of BLM, the NAACP, and the Black Liberation Project may have come across
as “radical” to law enforcement and city officials, these specific groups were not seen as
“threatening” as the looters and “militants” of the “Ferguson Unrest.” The primary goal
held by the North Minneapolis, MN demonstrators was the release of the videotapes
related to Jamar Clark’s shooting. Law enforcement’s general impression of protesters
was “threatening” because of the regular atmosphere of hostility and violence which
surrounded the Fourth Precinct during the evening demonstrations. The situation became
increasingly dangerous to officers to the point that most on or off-duty were not allowed
to leave the precinct for their own safety, and those who did had to be bused in and out.
While specific groups involved with the North Minneapolis Fourth Precinct occupation
may have been perceived as less-threatening than certain factions involved in Ferguson,
the general perception of demonstrators was found to be quite “threatening” by law
enforcement. Ferguson experienced factions of demonstrators with radical goals such as
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looting, vandalism, and initiating violence against police officers.280 This theory
contends that because North Minneapolis, MN protesters were regularly seen as
“threatening” to law enforcement, due to their large numbers and confrontational tactics,
they would experience regular police repression in response to this. Even though many
protesters were viewed as “threatening,” the occurrence of protest-policing violence or
repression was rare. Any use of repressive-force by law enforcement was inherently
limited by leadership,281 and the few cases where it was not as limited saw widespread
criticism.282 If it was not for city leadership refusing to authorize use-of-force in hopes of
ending the occupation peacefully, MPD officers could have implemented more
repression-based tactics from the start of the protests as the crowds became increasingly
“threatening.” It should be noted that protesters’ knowledge of the political pressures
from city and police leadership to end the occupation peacefully could have affected the
use and intensity of confrontational tactics.

Emily Wax-Thibodeaux and DeNeen L. Brown, “Ferguson protesters: The peaceful, the elders, the
looters, and the ‘militants,’” Washington Post, August 18, 2014:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ferguson-protesters-the-peaceful-the-elders-the-looters-and-themilitants/2014/08/18/d6be1262-26f3-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html?utm_term=.da52088a1b08.
281 Two primary examples of this: (1) when the vestibule was cleared, on day four, officers did so without
tactical helmets to improve their public image. (2) When the CART unit was implemented, on days three
and four, there was another tactical unit on standby, ready to be deployed if necessary, but SWAT teams
had to be deployed without the Bearcat transport because it looks too “militaristic.” This decision was
widely criticized among SWAT team members for concerns dealing with officer well-being. See citation
on p. 15 of the After-Action Report: MPD, referencing Chapter 7, “Officer Safety, Resilience, and
Wellness” beginning on page 115 of the report.
282 This was seen when both protesters and city officials complained about MPD’s use of chemical agents.
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Chart 8: Findings and Police Practice and Protest Interaction Theories

Theory Name (P1, 2, 3)
P1: ‘Threat/Repression’ Theory

P2: ‘Tactical Innovation’ Theory

P3: ‘Dynamic Interaction’ Theory

Findings
-Ferguson Unrest had multiple protesterfactions that implemented a variety of tactics
for a range of goals.
-N. Minneapolis had members from BLM,
multiple NAACP chapters, the Black
Liberation Project, faith leaders, and
unaffiliated community members.
-Ferguson had hundreds of protesters in the
streets every day and night; primarily African
American but also others.283
-N. Minneapolis had hundreds of protesters
outside the Fourth Precinct with a peak of
1000; primarily people from North
Minneapolis although ethnically diverse.284
-Ferguson Unrest exhibited the associatedcharacteristics of tactical innovation (T.I.), was
viewed as “threating,” and experienced regular
repression that stemmed from those
characteristics.
-N. Minneapolis greater exhibited the
associated-characteristics for T.I., was largely
seen as “threatening,” and yet experienced far
less repression rooted from this approach.
-Most instances of protest violence during
Ferguson followed the ‘dynamic interaction’
theory, but there were a few cases where police
officers were able to initiate violence without
interaction with protesters.
-Almost all cases of protest violence in North
Minneapolis followed the theory’s model
requiring both sides to interact to initiate
uncontainable violence and damage.

Numbers of protesters are approximated with a range from small groups to hundreds to around onethousand, and the “minority presence” variable can be generally evaluated through area demographics,
second-hand accounts, and social media footage. Primarily black before people from other regions started
arriving in Ferguson, MO around August 12 & 13.
284 Note: Ethnicities and backgrounds became notably more diverse as more outsiders, in need of food and
shelter, arrived at the occupation camp in North Minneapolis, MN on November 27. See After Action
Report: MPD.
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Tactical Innovation Theory (P2)
Another police practice theory stresses tactical innovations, McAdam 1983; Wang
and Soule 2016 argue that “tactical innovation is rooted in movement-opponent
dynamics.” It is conceptualized that tactical innovation takes place when a new protest
tactic or a new re-combination of older tactics occurs, and that this can be brought on
from forces of change either within the movement or external to it. 285 Overall, Ferguson,
MO did not experience many tactical innovations. The primary tactical innovation that
occurred in Ferguson was facilitated through the protester’s use of social media and
personal communications (i.e., text message) to organize large crowds, in short amounts
of time, into mass demonstrations. The use by black rights/anti-police protesters of social
media as a tactical resource and organizational base, I would argue, qualifies it as a new
protest tactic. Another instance of tactical innovation occurred, starting on August 12,
when “hactivists” targeted city and police servers (i.e., through DDoS attacks and
“doxing”).286 North Minneapolis exhibited [more] instances of tactical innovation than
did Ferguson, primarily through their use of occupational tactics. Overall, the
“Northside” occupation of the Fourth Precinct facilitated multiple instances of tactical
innovation through the novel re-combination of occupational tactics with those of
traditional marches, “no cop zones,”287 acts of inconvenience (i.e., blocking highways),

Example of an internal change to movement processes can be, changes in the characteristics of the
organization or actors, while external changes can take the form of police repression or shifts in political
authority.
286 This tactic for protesting combined with the BLM social (media) movement, I would argue, qualifies as
a novel re-combination of older protest tactics.
287 “No cop zones” have been utilized by BLM protesters in the past, primarily seen in NYC (2015), but it
was through combining the tactic with that of starting the occupation of the Fourth precinct that qualifies
this as tactical innovation by novel re-combination.
285
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and the creation of a “shanty-town.”288 This is in addition to, for a short time, the
occupation of the police precinct’s front vestibule in protest of the officer-involved
shooting.
Throughout my research, a question remained unanswered by existing literature:
does, and if so how can, tactical innovation effect the actions (violent or nonviolent) of
law enforcement during situations of mass demonstrations? An initial hypothesis was
that the more tactical innovation experienced would correlate to an increased likelihood
of law enforcement responding with repression. This being based on the findings of Earl
(2003) which support the notion289 that the dependent variables for ‘tactical innovation’
are inherently linked to protest characteristics which lead to an increased likelihood of
protest-policing violence per Bromely and Shupe 1983; Davenport 2000; McAdam 1982;
and Wisler and Guigni 1999.290 Tactical innovation has been linked to protest success
per McAdam et al.;291 and Wang and Soule 2016.292 Because Ferguson experienced less
tactical innovation than North Minneapolis, analysts using these theories would contend
that North Minneapolis would experience greater levels of repression following these

Shanty-towns being differentiated from traditional occupations/sit-ins being the establishment of
“durable structures.” This was seen by MPD to have started after rumors spread of an “imminent” police
raid on Nov. 30.
289 Tactical innovation occurs when new protest tactics or multiple tactics are combined to create a “novel
re-combination per Wang and Soule (2016). Earl (2003) argues certain protest characteristics have been
linked to law enforcement perceiving protesters as “threatening” (which then raises the likelihood of
repression), which include: protesters’ use of new tactics, multiple tactics, and/or confrontational tactics;
number of protesters at the event; and the level of radicalism for each factions’ goals. The first two “threat
characteristics” match those which tactical innovation is, partly, dependent on. It is of note that tactical
innovation can be spurred through external changes such as police repression, so police repression can be
both the response to and cause of tactical innovation.
290 See Ratliff, “On the Stage of Change,” p. 14.
291 See McAdam 1983; McCammon 2012; Morris 1984; Taylor and Van Dyke [2004] 2008 as cited in
Wang and Soule, Tactical Innovation in Social Movements (2016).
292 Tactical innovation/interaction is linked with protest success for the following reasons: (1) innovation
temporarily increases the protesters’ bargaining power and (2) the emergence of new protest techniques can
be correlated to peak-moments in a movements’ activity. See Doug McAdam, “Tactical Innovation and the
Pace of Insurgency,” (1983) University of Arizona.
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incidents. North Minneapolis experienced more incidents of repression293 (prompted by
characteristics supportive of tactical innovation) than did Ferguson. This is despite that
Ferguson had more overall protest-policing violence than did North Minneapolis.
Tactical innovation has been shown to have a positive connection to protest success and
can be facilitated by the emergence of either new or novel re-combinations of older
protest tactics. It appears that tactical innovation also increases the likelihood of police
repression during protests because protesters’ implementation of new or multiple
tactics/techniques have additionally been linked to repressive police-responses (i.e.,
increased likelihood of protest-policing violence). Thus, increasing the chance of protest
success through tactical innovation also increases the risk for violence to occur, and that
tactical innovation can be cause or be caused by police repression.
Dynamic Interaction Theory (P3)
A final police practice theory argues that dynamic interactions between all actors
involved with a protest are argued to be linked to the emergence of collective violence
per Ratliff 2011. It is also argued that violent confrontations (i.e., an uncontrollable
incident of violent civil disorder and rioting) between police and protesters cannot be
initiated without first surpassing a violence-inhibition threshold which requires activeparticipation from both sides per Collins 2008, 2009; and Nassauer 2016. If violent
confrontations cannot be initiated by a single set of actors (e.g., protesters, counterprotesters, and police), then it would be expected that demonstrations in both Ferguson
and North Minneapolis would only result if both police and protesters initiate violence.

North Minneapolis, MN saw four main incidences of tactical innovation, with three of them prompting
repression (eventually). Ferguson, MO saw only two main incidents of tactical innovation, with only one
resulting in repression/protest-policing violence.
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While most violent confrontations among the “Ferguson Unrest” were initiated through
the dynamic interactions of demonstrators and police officers, there were multiple cases
in which confrontation was established almost solely through the actions of law
enforcement. In some cases, when protesters attempted to maintain an environment of
nonviolence against the confrontational efforts of law enforcement, violent confrontations
were typically initiated. The North Minneapolis Occupation did not experience many
instances of violent confrontation between police and protesters, but when they did, it
was due to the dynamic interaction of both sides. A supporting reason why there were
fewer instances of confrontation, compared to Ferguson, is because of Mayor Hodges’s
unwavering focus on ending the situation peacefully (i.e., refusing to authorize use-offorce and limiting the use of military style equipment). Throughout the occupation,
protests exhibited confrontational tactics (e.g., verbal harassment, throwing objects,
threatening officers lives) but these only led to violent confrontations when the police
also participated in initiating violence. Despite previous academic findings, these cases
have illuminated how violent confrontations typically require both sides but when law
enforcement alone attempts to initiate violence, they are far more likely to succeed than
protesters attempting the same thing. The case of North Minneapolis highlights law
enforcement’s important role in keeping protests from turning into civil disorders through
their self-restraint when it comes to responding to protesters with repression. This could
mean that the power of police-restraint during protests has the potential to be highly
influential when it comes to controlling the occurrence and intensity of violence.
Macro-Contextual Findings
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Each events’ contextual timing and sequence within the history of the movement
and criminal justice reform assists in explaining the different reactions Ferguson, MO and
North Minneapolis, MN had to police violence. Tilly (1984) argues that, “when things
happen within a sequence affects how they happen.” Understanding path dependent
sequencing of political processes requires that the temporal ordering of events having a
significant impact on the outcome of future events per Pierson 2000; Thelen 2002.
Focusing on the timing of events relative to one another can better explain complex social
dynamics (i.e., black rights movement and police reform). The trajectory of a movement,
if there is one, operates based on the varying mechanisms associated with (positive)
feedback loops.294
Ferguson, and the government reports which followed, served as an ignition for
the civil rights movement of the 21st century and the events of August 2014 have
significantly impacted future protests tactics, the movement overall, and
police/community responses to their demonstrations in coordination with the historical
context of the United States’ policing models. The COPS director Ronald L. Davis
described in the beginning of the Ferguson “after-action” report how these incidents of
mass demonstrations are “more than a moment of discord in one small community” but
rather a national movement for criminal justice reform that represents “a new civil rights
movement.”295 The after-action report stated how law enforcement officials who were
on-scene for the ‘Ferguson Unrest’ faced an “unprecedented situation” that has now

The three mechanisms of feedback loops: positive reinforcement (Hacker 2002), event backfiring
(Skocpol 1992), and historical conjuncture (Orren and Skowronek 2001; and Lieberman 1998). See Glenn,
The Two School, p. 155-156.
295 COPS, Ferguson, MO “After-Action” Report, p. IX.
294
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become a well-defined moment in policing history.296 If the Ferguson protests did not
occur or occurred differently, the North Minneapolis Fourth Precinct Occupation could
have ended with violence instead of peace. Examining developments in the movement’s
history, protest tactics, police responses, government reform efforts, and macro-historical
changes in policing styles will prove illuminating in exploring the varied interactions
these events had on the outcome and order of future events.
Chart 9: Findings and Macro-Context Theories

Theory Name (T1)
T1: ‘Timing/Feedback’ Theory

Findings
-Ferguson’s police response (and militarized
protest-policing in general) experienced a
“backfire” effect.297 Ferguson’s protesters
also experienced positive feedback (i.e.,
‘self-reinforcing’).298
-North Minneapolis experienced positive
policy outcomes following the interaction
between agencies (i.e., historical
conjuncture).

Event/Historical Sequencing
The historical sequencing of US policing styles299 played a major role in the
emergence of the Black Lives Matter protest movement by providing the context of
continued police-shootings of unarmed African Americans.300 The destruction associated
with Ferguson quickly served as a lesson to law enforcement about their response-tactics
to demonstrations, and even though other cities did not initially learn from it, Ferguson
See US DOJ, COPS Office, Ferguson, MO “After-Action” Report on Response to Demonstrations as
cited in Ryan J. Reilly, “’Provocative’ Police Tactics Inflamed Ferguson Protests, Experts Find,”
Huffington Post, Sept. 9, 2015: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ferguson-protests-police-tactics
report_us_55e622a3e4b0aec9f35506ad.
297 This style of response became increasingly criticized and difficult to manage with pressures from
protesters and the federal government. See Skocpol 1992.
298 In the form of continued protests, federal support for the movement, and gradual policy-successes
regarding police reform measures aligned with community-oriented policing.
299 From ‘escalated force’ to ‘negotiated management’ to ‘strategic incapacitation.’ See McPhail,
Schweingruber, and McCarthy (1998).
300 Emergence of the movement first started with the death of Trayvon Martin in 2012 and the “not guilty”
verdict for George Zimmerman.
296
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did.301 Throughout the 17 days of demonstrations, slight shifts in protest-policing
occurred as law enforcement struggled to maintain control over the situation. Even after
the first day, the negative effects military-style equipment and tactics had on protesters’
perspective of the police became better understood.302 A week into the “Ferguson
Unrest” saw incident command change leadership (from St. Louis County PD to Missouri
State Highway Patrol) as well as the first adaption police took in to how they responded
to the demonstrations.303 Based on media and government reports on law enforcement’s
response to Ferguson, there was exhibited consistent high degrees of violence, brought on
by large numbers of prohibited behaviors coupled with little communication efforts
between police and protesters.304 According to Gillham and Noakes (2007), the law
enforcement’s response to protests can be characterized as ‘strategic incapacitation.’305
In the wake of Ferguson, a goal of refining the standards of community
policing306 was established by President Obama’s “Executive Order 13684.” It was
effectively achieved five months later, in May of 2015, by the President’s Task Force on
21st Century Policing,307 and it has since been utilized by social movements (i.e., BLM)

Following the “Ferguson Unrest” was major protests in Baltimore, MD and New York City, NY that
ended in major civil disturbances similar, but not quite as shocking as, Ferguson, MO.
302 The lesson of minimizing the use of military-style equipment was learned quickly after law enforcement
used canines, tactical equipment, and snipers on the first day of the “Ferguson Unrest.”
303 Under the leadership of Missouri State Highway Patrol Captain Johnson, greater efforts were made to
communicate and empathize with the crowds rather than repress and intimidate them.
304 This was until after the first week of demonstrations when Missouri State Highway Patrol Captain
Johnson took over leading the incident-response, in which he made active-efforts to connect and
communicate with the community. See After Action Report: Ferguson, p.
305 ‘Strategic incapacitation’ is the more aggressive policing model that utilizes military-style equipment
and tactics, and typically uses force first and views protesters as threats. See Wood (2014)
306 The goal consisted of: finding and providing for the best partnership between law enforcement and local
communities aimed at reducing crime and building trust. See the President’s Task Force on 21st Century
Policing.
307 President Obama’s task force identified six pillars of importance: (1) Building Trust and Legitimacy, (2)
Policy and Oversight, (3) Technology and Social Media, (4) Community Policing and Crime Reduction, (5)
Training and Education, and (6) Officer Wellness and Safety. This task force report additionally
recognizes the ineffectiveness of relying on a single jurisdiction and has utilized the effectiveness of having
301
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& related organizations (i.e., Campaign Zero)308 to comprehensively propose
recommendations on policies involved with police reform,309 such as the promotion of
‘procedural just behavior.’310 It was from these, and other, findings that law enforcement
agencies, like the Minneapolis Police Department, were able to start implementing some
of the lessons which help in explaining the different responses from each city. The
protest response of MPD exhibited relatively low levels of violence (from law
enforcement), in part, because of the few behaviors considered prohibited coupled with
the extensive communication efforts on the part of police and city leadership. This would
categorize their response as ‘negotiated management’ per McPhail, Schweingruber, and
McCarthy (1998).311
The context of continued officer-involved shooting with unarmed African
Americans is what allowed for the 17-day situation in Ferguson to turn into a national
discussion and, eventually, a movement all its own. Due to the style of policing Missouri
utilized in 2014 (i.e., strategic incapacitation), the Ferguson protest-policing response was
highly reactive, aggressive, and relied heavily on militarized equipment and tactics. This
aggressive response had the effect of increasing violent protest behavior overall and,
from here, it did not take long for law enforcement officials to start changing their tactics
with the end-result of reducing violence. Following the “Ferguson Unrest,” further
a three-pronged leadership model, with jurisdictions in local government, law enforcement, and the
community.
308 BLM created ‘Campaign Zero’ to be a policy-focused project that generates police reform proposals.
Their goal is to reduce racial bias and police violence against African Americans.
309 Note: Community policing is defined by the office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)
as: “a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships
and problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public
safety issues such as crime, social disorder and fear of crime.”
310 It has four key aspects: (1) treating people with dignity and respect; (2) giving individuals a “voice”
during encounters; (3) being neutral and transparent in decision making; and (4) conveying trustworthy
motives.
311 The ‘negotiated management’ policing model is based in strong-communication which uses force as a
last resort. Initial efforts are in promoting protesters to police themselves.
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protests occurred all over the nation, prompting greater government reform efforts as well
as investigatory reports into police departments and their responses to demonstrations.
Destructive and violent protests wrought havoc to major U.S. cities following the deaths
of Freddie Gray (Baltimore, MD)312 and Eric Garner (New York City, NY).313 With the
government reports and findings on Ferguson published, in addition to the continued
violent protests throughout the country, changes in police tactics were becoming more
apparent. As police tactics shifted away from aggressive and militarized protestresponses, the tactics employed by protesters expanded. This could be seen in the
development of “no-cop zones,” starting in NYC, as well as protesters’ use of that and
other tactics (e.g., shanty-town occupation of the Fourth Precinct) in the North
Minneapolis, MN protests. Specifically, North Minneapolis, MN protesters were able to
alter their tactics to better take advantage of the fragile political environment faced by
Mayor Hodges and Chief Harteau. This primarily took form as policy-change demands
in coordination with negotiations for ending the occupation.
North Minneapolis was able to avoid becoming the next Ferguson, partly due to
the sequence of protest events (i.e., MPD was able to observe and learn from Ferguson’s
experience the year prior and the government reports which followed) as well as the
culture of professionalism that enhanced the ability for Minneapolis’ leadership to learn
from and retain the lessons identified from previous demonstrations. An important factor
in explaining the different response in North Minneapolis is how those in the minorityThe protests in Baltimore quickly turned into riots after aggressive police tactics. See Holly Yan and
Dana Ford, “Baltimore Riots: Looting, fires engulf city after Freddie Gray’s Funeral,” CNN (April 28,
2015): https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/27/us/baltimore-unrest/index.html.
313 The protests in NYC remained peaceful when compared to Ferguson but multi-day protests for Eric
Garner turned violent in Berkley, CA. See Harrison Jacobs, “Eric Garner Protests Turn Violent in
California,” Business Insider (Dec. 7, 2014): http://www.businessinsider.com/eric-garner-protests-turnviolent-in-california-2014-12.
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community expected something like Ferguson to happen. A criminal justice professor at
Metropolitan State University and member of the local NAACP chapter, Jason Sole, was
quoted in an interview with the Star Tribune describing the context prior to the shooting
of Jamar Clark.314 The key findings from the COPS “after-action” report on Ferguson
got leaked in June 2015, five months before the occupation incident in North
Minneapolis.315 This gave MPD even more time to learn for FPD’s mistakes, considering
the report was not officially released until September of 2015. Having a culture of
learning and following the best practices available is what allowed for North Minneapolis
to succeed (at least partially) in learning enough from the “Ferguson Unrest” to avoid the
levels of community-level violence that ravaged Ferguson.
Feedback & Policy
Ferguson experienced multiple feedback mechanisms during the demonstrations
of August 2014 due to the excessive-nature the actions committed by police and
protesters. While both were excessive in their use of confrontation and violent tactics,
each experienced different a mechanism. The police experienced a “backfire” because of
their aggressive tactics in responding to the protests, which could be seen in increased
effort on the parts of the federal government (i.e., President Obama’s “taskforce” and
Attorney General Eric Holder going to Ferguson). Even though the militarized response
was highly criticized of, it was not until the after the repeated occurrences of violence

Quote from Jason Sole, “We’ve been saying for a long time that Minneapolis was one bullet away from
Ferguson. Well, that bullet was fired last night.” See David A. Graham, “How Did Jamar Clark Die?” The
Atlantic, November 18, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/jamar-clark-is-thenext-great-police-brutality-controversy/416418/.
315 See US DOJ, COPS Office, Ferguson, MO “After-Action” Report on Response to Demonstrations as
cited in Ryan J. Reilly, “’Provocative’ Police Tactics Inflamed Ferguson Protests, Experts Find,”
Huffington Post, Sept. 9, 2015: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ferguson-protests-police-tactics
report_us_55e622a3e4b0aec9f35506ad.
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following the protests in NYC, for Eric Garner, and Baltimore, Freddie Gray, that
significant changes in police practice and procedures could be seen.316 With the
occurrence of each protest, government efforts to propose solutions and mitigate
adversity increased, putting greater pressure on police departments that were slow or
refused to make changes in accordance with the recommendations from the Task Force
on 21st Century Policing. Resisting federal efforts to reform policing became even more
difficult once the reports and findings related to Ferguson were released. This highlights
how efforts to continue down the “old” path of policing became increasingly difficult
(i.e., “event backfiring” per Skocpol 1992) after the responses to Ferguson, and how
other efforts to promote policy reforms aimed at bettering the state of communityoriented policing were strengthened. This was despite Ferguson protesters use of violent
and confrontational tactics and, unlike the police, the protest movement experienced selfreinforcement from itself and the federal government per Hacker 2002.
This self-reinforced sequence prompted the continued protests and policy reforms
which led to MPD’s unique response to the North Minneapolis Fourth Precinct
occupation. North Minneapolis experienced the historical conjuncture mechanism per
Liberman 1998; and Orren and Skowronek 2001. Despite concerns from law
enforcement over officer safety and wellbeing, city leadership had an intense focus on
ending the protests peacefully and avoiding what happened in Ferguson. Mayor Hodges
was able to end it peacefully, despite resistance from law enforcement along the way. A
part of this strategy led to the adoption of certain demands made by protesters to include

Seen in the practical responses of police to BLM protests through lessened use of military-style
equipment and tactics in favor of greater communication before any confrontations are made. Noted
incidents of SWAT units not using full amount of gear (e.g., no helmets) when clear the from vestibule of
North Minneapolis’ Fourth Precinct.
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new or reformed policies, and most of them were met.317 The interaction effects between
city and police officials with government agencies produced positive policy support
throughout the occupation.
Like movements and processes, policy decisions affect later policies, and are
especially illuminating when they follow the pattern of feedback loops. Skocpol (1992)
argues that policies influence the creation of future policies.318 A large policy-win
following Ferguson, MO (in the form of a self-reinforcing mechanism) was the
widespread adoption and funding for police bodycams.319 This was commented on in
2014 by executive director of the Police Executive Research Forum, Chuck Wexler, that
efforts to promote the use of bodycams existed before Ferguson but that it garnered
increased attention among police departments nationwide.320 In addition to this, 120
communities established Civilian Review Boards321 for police misconduct, as of
September 2015, as well as other reported successes.322 The use of bodycams quickly
became an example of ‘policy diffusion,’ where policymakers from certain areas
implement policies they learned of from other policymakers’ experiences.323 By the end
of September 2014, it is reported that over 5,000 departments had some kind of
BLM negotiators made a list of (5) demands on Nov. 29, and additionally called for Mayor Hodges to
advocate for the ‘Working Families Agenda.’ See “The Working Families Agenda,” Democrats’
Committee on Education and the Workforce, last accessed November 9, 2015, http://democratsedworkforce.house. gov/workingfamilies as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 34.
318 See Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, (1992) p. 152.
319 While some view bodycams as another means of monitoring already disenfranchised groups, it was
largely seen as a win because of the evidence it can provide following an officer-involved shooting.
320 Ben Kesling and Pervaiz Shallwani, “Ferguson Shooting Helps Spur Police-Camera Use,” The Wall
Street Journal, September 30, 2014.
321 It is worth noting that Minneapolis had the Civilian Review Authority (CRA) as external/civilian
oversight for police back in 2012, but those who started the program left after it became clear that police
leadership would not listen to their rulings or recommendations. See Transcript (statement by Jerry
McAfee) at 188 as cited in US Commission on Civil Rights, Civil Rights and Police Practices:
Minneapolis, (March 2018), p. 32: http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/03-22-MN-Civil-Rights.pdf.
322 Some policy success saw demilitarization federally, the use of grand juries in cases involving deadly
force from a police officer, and a rise of officers being charged for crimes committed.
323 See Mettler and Sorelle, “Policy Feedback Theory,” (2014), p. 152.
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bodycams in use.324 A comprehensive list of 10 recommendations325 have been made
from integrating the ideas from communities, researchers, and government reports.326 A
prime example of this was seen in Orlando, FL where Campaign Zero helped push
through reforms which added restrictions to police use-of-force with the help Police
Chief John Mina.327 Since then, 28 states have enacted police-reform legislation
endorsed by Campaign Zero.328
US policing trends led to the context of regular police-involved shootings,
allowing for an incident like the “Ferguson Unrest” could occur. The police response
brought about continued protest violence in Ferguson, MO and across the country,
prompting heightened government involvement with criminal justice reforms. From this
development brought about a major shift in the promotion of community-oriented
policing over past-models that relied on repressive uses-of-force. The reports and lessons
identified by government assessment-teams gave law enforcement agencies a standard to
work from, bringing about gradual changes in how protest-policing is handled. With law
enforcement agencies shifting toward non-confrontational ways of dealing with protests,
protesters started to adapt, as was seen in North Minneapolis, to these by implementing
increasingly confrontational tactics. The newest development in the BLM movement
happened as a result in a large institutional change: the election of President Donald J.
Kesling and Shallwani, “Ferguson Shooting.”
Recommendation: (1) end broken window policing; (2) community oversight; (3) limit use of force; (4)
independently investigate and prosecute; (5) community representation; (6) bodycams/film the police; (7)
training; (8) end for-profit policing; (9) demilitarization; and (10) fair police union contracts.
326 Recommendations were integrated from 80 campuses, the Black Liberation Collective, the Justice in
Policing Toolkit (research organization), and the President’s Taskforce for 21st Century Policing.
327 See Cordeiro, “How an Orlando data scientist is helping #BlackLivesMatter make the case against
police violence,” Orlando Weekly (March 23, 2016): https://www.orlandoweekly.com/orlando/how-anorlando-data-scientist-is-helping-the-blacklivesmatter-movement-make-the-case-against-policeviolence/Content?oid=2478826.
328 This information came from an interview with policy analyst and data scientist for Campaign Zero, Sam
Sinyangwe. See Durgin, “Finding Common Ground with Black Lives Matter,” The National Review, (July
13, 2016): https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/07/black-lives-matter-policies-conservatives-can-support/
324
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Trump and, equally important, the appointment of Attorney General Jeff Sessions.
Decreased numbers of demonstrations have been noted since the election due to many
BLM chapters focusing on effectively implementing policies at the local level (i.e., from
protests to policies).329

Note: The focus on local change comes at a time where the members of BLM recognize that, federally,
they have lost their governmental allies. Now they are dealing with a President and Attorney General who
prefer the ‘escalated force’ policing model of the 1950s-1960s and operate under the assumption that civil
rights investigations in police department do more harm than good.
329
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CONCLUSION

Ferguson was a wake-up call to America in how African Americans are policed as
well as how police respond to protests in the face of officer-involved shootings. Violence
was swift and unrelenting on the parts of police and protesters over the 17 days of
Ferguson protests in August of 2014. Even as leadership shifted over the course of the
protests and more measures were put in place to limit confrontation, protest-policing
violence was the regular theme of the demonstrations. The after-action report on the
police response to the Ferguson demonstrations produced 46 findings and over 100
lessons. This report was made in the hopes of guiding proper police responses for mass
demonstrations for the other 16,000 police departments in the US. The reports’ aim is to
acknowledge the problems and solutions which occurred so that mistakes are not repeated
in the future. The report also acknowledges how the leaders who called for this report
recognize that, “the truth often hurts, but selective ignorance is fatal to an
organization.”330
Although the Minneapolis Police Department was able to successfully maintain
the peacefulness of the occupational demonstrations, there are still areas in need of
serious improvement in how law enforcement agencies handle BLM-associated protests.
In fact, the after-action report identified 36 findings and 71 recommendations dealing
with, among others, aspects such as leadership, internal/external communications, use of
force, officer safety, and community engagement. Keeping the peace is only one part of
this equation, and I would contend that only focusing on this aspect will inevitably bring
negative consequences to the surrounding neighborhood as well as to the well-being of
330

See After Action Report: Ferguson, p. IX.
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the officers involved. Considering Minneapolis’ experience in handling the occupation
event based on previous lessons learned from other police departments, officer
accountability has only slightly improved but the relationship of trust and legitimacy
between MPD and the communities of Minneapolis is still lacking. Many members of
the community have commented for interviews with local news outlets how, even with
changes in MPD leadership, they do not perceive real change in how their community is
being policed and still do not trust police, city, or community leadership.
America is at a crossroads for its policing tactics because, while police reform has
come a long way, there is increasing pressure from President Trump and Attorney
General Jeff Sessions to usher back in those aggressive police tactics of the 2000s. The
investigatory-ability into police departments by the DOJ is not foreseen to be utilized
under U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, making the existing reports and findings from
recent investigations into police practices and protest responses more valuable. This
makes the path forward for policing more critical in the coming years and puts a majority
of the responsibility on local and state levels. It is up to the police departments and their
municipalities to continue down the path of community policing and build upon the work
of the previous administration.331
I do not predict these kinds of protests ending anytime soon and, in fact, they
seem to have an effect of self-perpetuation based on actions/events from outside and
within the movement, so more effective actions must be taken to mitigate the chance of
future BLM protests from turning into riots. There is a need for a comprehensive
perspective drawing from multiple theories.

Reforming police policies as well as acknowledging the still-existing problems while repairing and
maintaining relations between police departments and their communities.
331
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The micro-contextual theories illuminated how the background history,
demographics, and culture of an area can influence the occurrence and intensity of
community-level violence. This was primarily seen with a hard shift toward Ferguson
becoming predominantly African American while still maintaining a police force and city
government that is controlled almost exclusively by the white members of the area that
started leaving Ferguson in the 1990s. Without the time for previous experiences of
community-level violence, Ferguson law enforcement had no way of preparing for the
mass demonstrations that followed Michael Brown’s death. The ‘ethnic diversity’ theory
relates to the ‘community history of violence’ theory in how the ethnic diversity of an
area can affect the levels of community-level violence, and this was seen through
Ferguson and North Minneapolis. Incidents of community-level violence, among African
Americans, tend to happen after a major race-related incident or officer-involved
shooting. This also appears to happen more often in areas with more close-knit
communities as well as minority communities who have been in the area for longer.
Each area’s culture is affected by the kinds of people who live in it and, from this, affects
how police regularly use violence in their everyday practices as well as during protests.
An area’s history of community violence will also impact how police go about using
violence because if a community turns violent without past-precedent, police may not
know the best course of action and chose to use either violence or nonviolence. While an
area that has experienced community-violence will have a more informed law
enforcement acting based on prior-knowledge for what followed past violent and
nonviolent police actions. Each micro-context theory alone did not illuminate much on
the circumstances between Ferguson and North Minneapolis but, when combined, these
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theories showed how the community-history prior to each event affected how it turned
out (i.e., less diversity (among all ethnic groups) combined with a lacking history of
community-violence allowed for the uncontrollable incidents of violence).
The police protester interaction theories provided insights into the protest
incidents of how and when protesters acted confrontationally/violently, when they were
responded to with repression, and how they reacted to such. It also explored the varying
use of protest tactics between Ferguson and North Minneapolis and how incidences of
tactical innovation influenced law enforcement practices. The ‘threat/repression’ theory
relates to the ‘dynamic interaction’ theory in how the perception of threat plays a large
role in whether actors (police or protesters) initiate violence. As was seen in Ferguson,
when protesters were viewed as threatening, law enforcement used repressive tactics.
Despite protesters being perceived as threatening, because of direct orders from city and
police leadership not to physically engage law enforcement only used repressive tactics
when deemed necessary (e.g., clearing the vestibule on day three or clearing the
encampment on day eighteen). The police practice and protester interaction theories
alone illuminated the most because of their focus on the occurrences during each event.
This is due to their analysis of what build up to confrontations, when confrontations were
made, and how they were initiated as well as how they concluded. In Ferguson,
confrontations were built out of emotional tensions and levels of threat varying in
between the protesters and police. They occurred mostly in the evening and ended after
hours of violence, while North Minneapolis experienced minimal incidents of
confrontation, they were similarly built up through emotional tensions and lasted for
hours at a time.
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The macro-contextual theories provided even greater insights on the overarching
sequence policing styles have on protest styles and vice versa. These theories utilize
police practice theories over history with those of timing, sequence, and policy feedback.
Aggressive and discriminatory policing practices of 20th century America created a
context of increased officer-involved shootings of, primarily, unarmed African
Americans. This context allowed for the Black Lives Matter movement to be born and
flourish as shootings and protests continued to occur and adapt to changes in federal
policies and police practices. From these protest adaptations, law enforcement has also
had to adapt its tactics under continued protests and pressure from all levels of
government. The macro-context theories were particularly helpful in understanding the
“big picture” of all the small changes that happened in between shooting-inspired
protests. It was from the macro-related theories that I produced a graphic showcasing
how, over time, police practices shaped BLM protester tactics and, from these changes,
prompted further changes in the practices of police officers.
There is a cyclical macro-historical pattern of policing styles affecting protest
styles, and those changes in protest styles, in turn, affect future-policing styles. The
historical sequencing of US policing styles (from 1950 – 2010) provided the societal
context of increased officer-involved shootings of unarmed African Americans which
allowed for the Black Lives Matter protest movement to originate out of Ferguson and
flourish throughout the nation. From the initial reactions to the police response in
Ferguson, state and federal government responses have been supportive of the BLM
movement and their nonviolent protest efforts. With the support of the federal
government, BLM demonstrations have shifted in their use of confrontational tactics in
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tandem with shifting police practices (i.e., from more to less confrontational during
protests). Law enforcement efforts in Ferguson were characterized with aggressive and
militarized responses and over time, while under the continued pressure from the federal
government to continue police reform efforts, these practices changed becoming more
defensive. In part due to this, he non-confrontational and defensive characterization
accurately depicts the law enforcement response to the North Minneapolis Occupation.
See Appendix B.
As this study is exploratory in nature, there are some inherent limitations to my
findings. For instance, all analyses are conducted qualitatively and only examine a few,
out of many, theories from each sub-type (i.e., micro-context; police protester interaction;
and macro-context). Additionally, some of the after-action reports state that some of the
reports on each incident do have some conflicting accounts. These two events (Ferguson
and North Minneapolis) occurred more than a year apart, in different seasons, so it may
be worth investigating whether two case studies with similar temporal factors would have
different outcomes to the two used in this study. Each theory alone does not fully
illuminate the different reactions in Ferguson and North Minneapolis, but more can be
understood by examining them all together and how they affect each other.
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APPENDIX A: HISTORY OF U.S. POLICING STYLE & MODELS

The policing style of the mid-twentieth century has been labelled the ‘escalating
force’ model and was known for being “strictly legalistic and hostile towards protests,”
particularly from 1950 to 1970. This model was known for its use of force in law
enforcements agencies’ attempts to disperse disruptive or peaceful protesters (e.g., the
May 1970 confrontation between students and National Guard soldiers at Kent State
University).
This trend toward more-aggressive policing styles for protests has been seen in
Europe during the same time (i.e., 2002-2012), particularly well-shown in a study on
Italian law enforcement per Calafati 2013. Amnesty International released two reports in
2012 critical of law enforcements’ “disproportionate use of violence during protests,”
specifically focused in Greece, Romania, and Spain. The major issues cited from the
reports was excessive use-of-force, abuse of “less-lethal” weapons, obstructing access to
medical services, and arbitrary detention per Amnesty International 2012 a, b. This
theory on the return of aggressive policing styles was argued by Della Porter & Reiter
1998 to be merely the exception to the overarching trend of “softer policing” (i.e., a
greater emphasis put on protecting people’s right to protest). Under this trend of policing
(as seen in western democracies, such as Italy), there is a certain amount of tolerance for
violations of the law and repressive tactics are only saved as a last resort. Della Porter &
Reiter 1998 argue that the primary goal of the police is understanding and utilizing tools
to assist in the de-escalation of varying protest situations. Della Porter & Reiter 2003,
2004 argue how academics have been cautious in analyzing a comeback of violent protest
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policing in Italy and argued that such cases in which the police response had been overlyviolent were exceptions to the rule. Calafati (2013) cites, among others, an incredible
incident of aggressive protest policing by Italian law enforcement during the antiglobalization movements’ protests of the 2011 G8 Summit in Genoa per Jurris 2008;
Della Porter & Reiter 2003, 2004; Amnesty International 2001, 2011. Another
examination of western democracies (i.e., Australia) show how policing styles have
shifted, since the start of the 21st century, from a “negotiated management style” of
policing to a “coercive style” per Baker 2008. He argues (using examples like
Melbourne’s Global Economic Forum 2000, Melbourne’s G20 summit 2006, etc.) the
advent of the anti-globalization movement has a connection to the rise of western
democracies using more “coercive style” tactics in policing protests. He contends that
this can be explained by the trend that when protests involve economic interests or people
of importance (usually on an international-basis), the initial tactics of protest policing
tends to be more coercive than negotiation based. Baker 2008 contends the difficulty of
avoiding violence is due to the need of building a dialogue, and the preparing of all plans
& precautions prior to the event.
The extensive implementation of community policing is primarily due to the
congressional passage of the “Public Safety Partnership and Community Policing Act of
1994.”332 When law enforcement agencies establish collaborative partnerships with their
communities, these relationships tend to build trust between members of the community

See Wells and Falcone, Policing in the United States, (2005). This act authorized $9 billion in funding
to be directed toward COP implementation, the hiring of 110,000 additional police officers, and created the
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (“COPS Office”) for its implementation.
332

93

and the police per Skogan, Steiner, DuBois, Gudell, and Fagan (2002a).333 Officers
trained in COP engage the community as equal-partners and are well-versed in public
relations, community partnerships, and problem-solving techniques, resulting in greater
public support and cooperation with the police to better help combat crime.334 An
example of a community outreach program is the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy
(CAPS) program where community members participate in meetings with law
enforcement and collaborate in the decision-making process per Skogan, Steiner, DuBois,
Gudell, and Fagan (2002b).335
Like other western democracies, the United States has also seen this aggressive
trend of policing which followed during the height of community-oriented policing in the
1990s. These aggressive tactics have taken form in the gradual militarization of small
and local departments, greater use of SWAT-team tactics, tougher responses to political
protest, and a greater reliance on ‘war on drugs’ tactics like stop-and-frisk and “broken
window” policing. Scobell and Hammitt 1998 argue that militarized (or paramilitary)
police tend to do the following: “deploy as units rather than as individuals; seek training
from military personnel in the use of sophisticated weaponry, special apparel, and
equipment; and adopt a system of rank that replicates the structure of the military.”

See Skogan et al., 2002, Community policing and “the new immigrants”: Latinos in Chicago,
(Washington DC, US DOJ): https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/189908.pdf as cited in Portland State
University, Criminology and Criminal Justice Senior Capstone, "Police Community Partnerships: A
Review of the Literature" (2011), Criminology and Criminal Justice Senior Capstone Project, Paper 7.
http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/ccj_capstone/7?utm_source=pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu%2Fccj_capstone
%2F7&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages.
334 See Portland State University, Criminology Capstone, “Police Community Partnerships.”
335 See Skogan, et al., 2002, “Taking stock: Community policing in Chicago,” (Washington, DC: U.S.
DOJ): https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/189909.pdf as cited in Portland State University, Criminology
Capstone, “Police Community Partnerships.”
333
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APPENDIX B: MACRO-HISTORICAL GRAPHIC
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